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In	  recent	  years,	  much	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  in	  the	  scientific	  literature	  and	  the	  policy	  
community	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  to	  arise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  environmental	  degradation.	  In	  
China,	  studies	  warning	  of	  environmentally	  induced	  conflict	  in	  this	  country	  have	  
predominantly	  ended	  with	  highly	  predicted	  outcomes	  rather	  than	  careful	  analysis	  of	  specific	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  cooperation	  could	  forestall	  violence.	  With	  specific	  regard	  to	  the	  claim	  
of	  violent	  conflict	  arising	  from	  scarcity	  of	  water,	  the	  water-­‐relationship	  between	  upstream	  
Hebei	  province	  and	  downstream	  Beijing	  Muncipality	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin	  constitutes	  an	  
exception	  to	  the	  norm	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  cooperation	  when	  whe	  should	  expect	  
conflict.	  This	  paper	  deals	  with	  this	  empirical	  gap	  at	  the	  intrastate	  level	  by	  exploring	  how	  and	  
why	  water	  scarcities	  lead	  to	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  
basin	  when	  we	  should	  expect	  conflict.	  In	  question	  form,	  my	  primary	  research	  problem	  can	  
be	  expressed:	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  that	  self-­‐interested	  intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  
province	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  collaborating	  on	  scarce	  water	  resources?	  
	  
Methodologically,	  I	  chose	  a	  single-­‐case	  method	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  demonstrate	  causality.	  Using	  a	  
process	  tracing	  approach,	  I	  then	  went	  through	  my	  case	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  intervening	  
causal	  mechanism	  between	  the	  independent	  variable	  (water	  scarcity)	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	  dependent	  variable	  (cooperation).	  To	  conduct	  my	  analysis,	  I	  cross-­‐fertilized	  the	  
environmental-­‐cooperation	  theory	  with	  two	  of	  Nobel	  Price	  winner	  Elinor	  Ostroms	  eight	  
management	  principles	  and	  thereby	  created	  an	  analytical	  framework	  to	  apply	  on	  my	  case.	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  the	  study	  is	  of	  significance	  for	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  specify	  the	  conditions	  under	  
which	  groups	  of	  users	  will	  cooperate	  or	  fight	  over	  resources	  upon	  which	  they	  depend.	  It	  
demonstrates	  that	  water-­‐related	  cooperation	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  an	  external	  authority	  
rather	  than	  by	  voluntarily	  self-­‐organization	  of	  the	  intergovernments	  in	  Hebei	  and	  Beijing.	  
Contrary	  to	  Ostrom,	  this	  thesis	  highlight	  that	  an	  external	  authority	  –	  namely	  the	  State	  













?????????????????????????????????–	  	  Benjamin	  Franklin?
?
Preface	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  my	  work	  with	  this	  thesis,	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  people	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Martin	  Sjöstedt,	  Ph.D.,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Gothenburg	  University,	  Sweden,	  has	  
been	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  me,	  especially	  his	  comments	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  method	  and	  
guidance	  to	  look	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  cooperation.	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  Friend	  Association,	  Shijiazhuang,	  Hebei	  province,	  China	  provided	  the	  best	  contacts	  
available.	  Professor	  and	  Director	  Zhang	  Zhongmin	  has	  been	  an	  extremely	  knowledgeable	  
person,	  provided	  lots	  of	  useful	  information	  and	  arranged	  several	  of	  my	  interviews	  in	  China.	  
In	  this	  context,	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  friend	  Mr.	  Qie	  Xinjiang	  who	  helped	  me	  with	  
interviews	  and	  translation	  of	  important	  documents.	  Both	  persons	  have	  been	  indispensable	  
for	  my	  work	  and	  I	  am	  looking	  forward	  continue	  working	  with	  them	  in	  the	  future.	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  Program	  in	  China	  (EEPC),	  gave	  me	  a	  place	  to	  stay	  during	  my	  
time	  in	  Beijing	  and	  was	  always	  encouraging	  and	  provided	  me	  with	  brilliant	  knowledge	  banks.	  
The	  particular	  person	  I	  am	  thinking	  of	  is	  Coordinator	  and	  Professor	  Jintao	  Xu	  at	  the	  College	  
of	  Environmental	  Sciences	  and	  Engineering,	  Peking	  University	  whose	  support	  and	  contacts	  
has	  been	  outstanding.	  The	  highly	  intelligent	  colleague	  and	  student	  Fan	  Jie	  must	  also	  be	  
mentioned	  in	  this	  context.	  He	  was	  my	  interpreter	  during	  all	  my	  interviews	  and	  became	  a	  
good	  friend.	  
Gunnar	  Köhlin,	  Associate	  Professor	  and	  Director,	  EfD	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  Gothenburg	  
University,	  Sweden,	  provided	  me	  with	  vital	  contacts	  in	  China.	  
Oliver	  Hensengerth,	  Ph.D.,	  TAPIR	  Fellow	  of	  Chatam	  House,	  London,	  UK,	  was	  always	  very	  
supportive	  and	  provided	  me	  with	  some	  essential	  tips	  on	  literature	  which	  describes	  China´s	  
system	  of	  governance.	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  Jia,	  Professor,	  Institute	  of	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Chinese	  Academy	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  Sciences,	  China,	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  useful	  comments	  on	  this	  project	  and	  helped	  me	  
with	  contacts	  in	  the	  field.	  
The	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  Cooperation	  Agency	  (SIDA),	  gave	  me	  financial	  
support	  and	  made	  my	  field	  trip	  to	  China	  possible.	  
Marie	  Carlsson,	  Sinologist	  and	  Lecturer	  at	  the	  Institute	  for	  Global	  studies	  at	  Gothenburg	  
University,	  Sweden,	  has	  been	  an	  important	  person	  for	  my	  knowledges	  and	  interests	  of	  
China.	  
Gunnar	  Falkemark,	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  science,	  Gothenburg	  University,	  
Sweden,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  inspirations	  throughout	  my	  studies	  in	  Gothenburg.	  His	  
book	  ”Politics,Mobility	  and	  Environment”	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  as	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worked	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  Svensson	  who	  helped	  me	  in	  
innumerable	  ways.	  Many	  other	  who	  are	  not	  listed	  here,	  I	  wish	  to	  thank	  for	  their	  support	  and	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ”Wherever	  there	  is	  a	  river,	  there	  is	  no	  water;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Wherever	  there	  is	  water,	  it	  is	  heavily	  polluted”	  






	  This	  thesis	  is	  dedicated	  to	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Chinas	  people	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  this	  future	  –	  their	  future	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  will	  be	  more	  democratic	  and	  more	  sustainable	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ours	  has	  been	  
	   4	  
Trans-­‐boundary	  Water	  Cooperation	  in	  China	  
A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  district	  
	  
1 Presentation	  of	  Problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
2 Area	  of	  Research	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  
2.1 Social	  and	  Scientific	  Relevance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  
2.2 Statement	  of	  Purpose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  
2.3 Outline	  of	  Thesis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  
3 Theoretical	  Framework	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  
3.1 Water	  Scarcity	  and	  Conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  
3.2 Water,	  Cooperation	  and	  Sharing	  of	  Benefits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  
4 Research	  Design	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  
4.1 Definitions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  
4.2 Research	  Questions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  
4.3 Selection	  of	  Case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  
4.4 Method	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  
4.5 Generalisation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  
5 Bureaucratic	  Structures	  on	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  
5.1 Legal	  and	  Institutional	  Background	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  
5.2 Weakness	  in	  Local	  Environmental	  Protection	  Departments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  
5.3 River	  Basin	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  
6 The	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  Case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  
6.1 General	  Overview	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  
6.2 The	  Decline	  of	  Guanting	  and	  Rise	  of	  Miyun	  Reservoir	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  
6.3 Water	  Conflicts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  
6.4 From	  Conflicts	  to	  Sharing	  of	  Benefits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  
6.5 Eco-­‐Compensation	  in	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  
7 Analysis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  
8 Conclusion	  and	  Remarks	  for	  Future	  Studies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  
9 References	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  
9.1 Literature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  






	   5	  
1	  Presentation	  of	  Problem	  
The	  apocalyptic	  warnings	  of	  water	  wars	  have	  appeared	  frequently	  in	  scientific	  journals	  over	  
the	  years.	  As	  the	  severity	  of	  water	  resources	  have	  intensified	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  so	  have	  the	  
conflicts1.	  According	  to	  these	  theories	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  water	  and	  violence	  where	  
strained	  environmental	  resources	  contribute	  to	  conflict.	  One	  notable	  researcher	  in	  the	  field	  
has	  been	  Thomas	  Homer-­‐Dixon	  who	  addresses	  the	  connection	  between	  environmental	  
scarcity	  and	  violent	  conflict.	  According	  to	  him	  the	  likelihood	  of	  violent	  conflict	  is	  greatest	  
when	  supply,	  demand	  and	  distributional	  sources	  of	  the	  scarcity	  of	  renewable	  resources	  
interacts2.	  Some	  of	  the	  research	  conducted	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  Homer-­‐Dixons	  theories	  
has	  been	  made	  on	  China.	  Homer-­‐Dixon	  mentions	  China	  as	  a	  particularly	  pivotal	  state	  
because	  of	  high	  population	  growth,	  serious	  water	  scarcity	  and	  deforestation.	  He	  claims	  that	  
these	  factors	  threaten	  to	  cause	  major	  internal	  violence	  or	  disintegrate	  the	  whole	  state	  in	  
the	  future3.	  While	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  studies	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  
environmental	  degradation	  and	  violent	  conflict,	  the	  equally	  important	  issue	  of	  how	  
environmental	  strain	  can	  provide	  incentives	  for	  cooperation	  has	  rarely	  been	  subjected	  to	  
systematic	  analysis4.	  Most	  research	  that	  has	  been	  undertaken	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  environmental	  
cooperation	  suggests	  that	  international	  river	  basin	  management	  could	  enhance	  peace	  
between	  countries.	  To	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  this	  thesis	  will	  focus	  on	  
transboundary	  water	  resources	  at	  the	  intrastate	  level	  in	  Northern	  China.	  
	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  population	  growth	  and	  industrial	  expansion	  in	  the	  north,	  China	  has	  
experienced	  escalating	  water	  demands,	  further	  intensifying	  water	  shortage	  in	  these	  areas.	  
This	  leads	  to	  competition	  over	  scarce	  water	  resources,	  especially	  in	  the	  transboundary	  
regions	  of	  a	  river	  basin,	  which	  are	  generally	  under	  different	  political	  jurisdictions.	  The	  
scarcity	  is	  greatest	  in	  the	  Hai	  River	  basin,	  which	  originates	  from	  the	  upstream	  Hebei	  
province	  to	  downstream	  Beijing.	  Although	  these	  major	  stakeholders	  by	  this	  reasoning	  
exhibits	  the	  conditions	  usually	  found	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  environmental	  scarcity	  indicating	  
that	  competition	  over	  the	  resource	  is	  expected	  to	  produce	  violence,	  violent	  conflict	  has	  not	  
occurred.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcities	  lead	  to	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Conca, Ken., (2006), ”The New face of Water Conflict” in Navagating Peace: No.3 p.1, Woodrow Wilson 
Center.	  
2	  Urdal, Henrik., (2008), ” Population, Resources and Political violence: A Subnational Study of India, 1956-
2002”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 52 Number 4, p.594.	  
3	  Homer-Dixon, T.F., (1999), ”Environment, Scarcity and Violence”, Princeton University Press: Princeton 
p.19-21.	  
4	  Carius, Alexander., (2006), ” Environmental Peacebuilding: Conditions for Success”, Woodrow Wilson 
Center p.59. The article is adapted from a longer report prepared for the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, availabe online at http://www.ecc-
platform.org/images/adelphi_report_environmental_peacemaking.pdf	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2	  The	  Area	  of	  Research	  
This	  thesis	  will	  start	  with	  a	  brief	  application	  of	  the	  scientific	  debate	  this	  study	  contributes	  to	  
in	  terms	  of	  social	  and	  scientific	  relevance.	  Some	  of	  the	  recent	  research	  gaps	  will	  be	  
explained	  and	  a	  context	  is	  opened	  for	  my	  study.	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  present	  the	  purpose	  
of	  the	  study.	  
	  
	  
2.1	  Social	  and	  Scientific	  relevance	  
	  
When	  formulating	  a	  research	  problem	  in	  social	  science,	  you	  often	  require	  that	  it	  must	  meet	  
two	  requirements.	  It	  must	  be	  both	  socially	  relevant	  and	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  scientific	  
community.	  Put	  another	  way:	  The	  problem	  must	  be	  grounded	  in	  both	  social	  and	  scientific	  
relevance.	  My	  problem,	  which	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms,	  is	  about	  fresh-­‐water	  
resources	  and	  its	  importance	  to	  life	  and	  livelihoods.	  We	  have	  passed	  the	  halfway	  point	  
towards	  the	  2015	  target	  date	  for	  achieving	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals,	  and	  despite	  
progress,	  massive	  challenges	  remain.	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal	  7	  calls	  for	  halving	  the	  
proportion	  of	  people	  without	  sustainable	  access	  to	  safe	  drinking	  water.	  While	  the	  world	  is	  
on	  track	  to	  achieve	  the	  water	  target	  globally,	  large	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  and	  many	  countries	  
lag	  behind,	  and	  some	  risk	  backsliding5.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  China	  where	  300	  
million	  people	  are	  without	  access	  to	  safe	  water	  supply.	  According	  to	  Ma	  Jun,	  a	  leading	  
Chinese	  water	  expert,	  several	  cities	  near	  Beijing	  and	  Tianjin,	  in	  the	  northeastern	  region	  of	  
the	  country,	  could	  run	  out	  of	  water	  in	  five	  to	  seven	  years6.	  The	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  
limited	  freshwater	  resources	  makes	  greater	  and	  deeper	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  manage	  
transboundary	  waters	  essential.	  Availability	  of	  water	  affects	  our	  everyday	  lives	  and	  how	  we	  
manage	  this	  critical	  resource	  is	  something	  that	  we	  every	  day	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  consider.	  My	  
study	  therefore	  fulfills	  the	  requirement	  of	  social	  relevance.	  How	  is	  it	  with	  the	  scientific	  
relevance?	  My	  study	  meets	  the	  scientific	  requirement	  for	  two	  reasons.	  
	  
First,	  the	  water	  scarcity	  is	  greatest	  in	  the	  Hai	  River	  basin,	  with	  120	  million	  inhabitants,	  
including	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  province,	  which	  shows	  the	  highest	  population	  pressure	  on	  
scarce	  water	  resources	  in	  China7.	  While	  the	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  the	  population	  
dynamics	  indicate	  environmental	  scarcity	  and	  mirror	  the	  conditions	  said	  to	  lead	  to	  violent	  
conflict	  –	  according	  to	  Homer-­‐Dixon	  –	  violence	  has	  not	  occurred.	  Surprisingly,	  researchers	  
know	  relatively	  little	  about	  why	  the	  dogs	  bark	  in	  some	  cases	  but	  not	  in	  others	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
similar	  levels	  or	  forms	  of	  environmental	  scarcity8.	  Why	  does	  environmental	  scarcity	  produce	  
conflict	  in	  some	  cases	  but	  not	  in	  others?	  My	  ambition	  is	  to	  challenge	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  link	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The United Nations World Water Development Report., (2009), ”Water in a Changing World”, p.vii. 
Available online at 
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/pdf/WWDR3_Water_in_a_Changing_World.pdf 
6 Gang, Chen., (2009), ” Politics of Chinas Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress”, World 
Scientific Publishing CO: Singapore, p.7. 
7 The World Bank., (2009), ”Addressing China´s Water Scarcity: A Synthesis of Recommendations for Selected 
Water Resource Management Issues”, p.1. Available online at http://books.google.se 
8 Dabelko, Geoffrey., (2000), ” Environment, Population and Conflict: Suggesting a Few steps forward”, 
Environmental Change & Security Project Report. Issue 6, p.100.	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between	  environmental	  scarcity	  and	  conflict	  by	  conducting	  a	  empirical	  study	  of	  a	  site	  whose	  
scarcity	  conditions	  approximate	  those	  of	  cases	  used	  by	  proponents	  to	  underwrite	  their	  
claims.	  This	  research	  attempts	  to	  address	  this	  empirical	  gap,	  drawing	  on	  fieldwork	  
conducted	  by	  me	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin	  between	  April	  and	  May	  2010.	  
	  
Secondly,	  my	  case	  study	  provides	  a	  window	  into	  the	  forces	  generating	  various	  forms	  of	  
cooperation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  shared	  scarcity.	  This	  cooperation,	  the	  potential	  basis	  for	  
environment	  confidence-­‐building,	  represents	  an	  under-­‐explored	  field.	  In	  the	  article	  
“Environment,	  Population,	  and	  Conflict:	  Suggesting	  a	  few	  steps	  forward”	  Geoffrey	  D.	  
Dabelko	  points	  to	  a	  needed	  direction	  for	  research	  that	  focuses	  on	  cases	  where	  
environmental	  scarcity	  is	  present	  but	  a	  spectrum	  of	  outcomes	  from	  cooperation	  to	  conflict	  
occurs9.	  This	  thesis	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  by	  helping	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  
versus	  cooperation	  questions	  that	  have	  been	  asked	  repeatedly	  in	  this	  field.	  
	  
	  
2.2	  Statement	  of	  Purpose	  
My	  primary	  research	  problem	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcities	  lead	  to	  
cooperation	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin	  when	  we	  should	  
expect	  conflict.	  For	  those	  readers	  who	  find	  it	  natural	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  formulated	  in	  
question	  form,	  my	  primary	  research	  problem	  can	  be	  expressed:	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  that	  
self-­‐interested	  intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  
collaborating	  on	  scarce	  water	  resources?	  More	  specifically,	  my	  problem	  is	  focused	  on	  
understanding	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  connect	  water	  scarcity	  to	  cooperation.	  In	  
explanatory	  respect	  the	  institutional	  dynamics	  will	  particularly	  be	  scrutinized.	  When	  this	  
task	  is	  complete,	  it	  is	  also-­‐	  I	  believe-­‐	  possible	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  the	  causal	  links	  work.	  
With	  theories	  on	  water	  cooperation	  at	  my	  hand,	  I	  will	  in	  other	  words	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  
we	  find	  aspects	  of	  cooperation	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  conditions	  for	  environmentally	  prone	  
conflict	  seem	  to	  exist.	  Although	  theories	  suggest	  that	  environmental	  strain	  can	  provide	  
incentives	  for	  increased	  cooperation	  this	  topic	  lacks	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  is	  an	  area	  for	  
future	  research.	  As	  stated	  by	  Conca:	  ”	  the	  substate	  level	  of	  analysis	  for	  environmental	  
peacemaking	  clearly	  represents	  an	  area	  for	  future	  empirical	  and	  applied	  research	  in	  its	  own	  
right”.10	  To	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  this	  empirical	  study	  will	  examine	  the	  
outcome	  of	  water	  resource	  scarcity	  at	  the	  intrastate	  level	  between	  the	  capital	  Beijing	  and	  
Hebei	  province	  located	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin.	  
Before	  I	  continue,	  let	  me	  first	  define	  what	  I'm	  not	  going	  to	  do.	  I	  will	  not	  framing	  the	  
environmental	  problematique	  in	  security	  terms	  and	  discuss	  the	  advantages	  and	  
disadvantages	  of	  linking	  environmental	  problems	  to	  security	  concerns.	  The	  environmental	  
security	  debate	  will	  not	  be	  included	  in	  my	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Dabelko, Geoffrey., (2000), ” Environment, Population and Conflict: Suggesting a Few steps forward”, 
Environmental Change & Security Project Report. Issue 6, p.101.	  
10 Conca, Ken & Dabelko Geoffrey., (2002), ”Environmental Peacemaking”, The John Hopkins University 
Press: Baltimore and London, p.231. 
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2.3	  Outline	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
I	  will	  conclude	  this	  introductory	  chapter	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  thesis	  structure.	  In	  the	  
next	  chapter	  (3)	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  this	  studys	  theoretical	  framework.	  I	  will	  then	  present	  the	  
case	  study	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  research	  strategy	  in	  chapter	  (4).	  Chapter	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  are	  
empirical	  and	  several	  empirical	  ”explanatory	  pieces”	  will	  figure.	  Some	  more	  systematic	  
attempt	  for	  explaination	  will	  not	  be	  made	  here,	  but	  will	  be	  carried	  forward	  to	  chapter	  (7)	  –	  
where	  the	  research	  question	  will	  be	  answered	  through	  an	  analysis	  linking	  the	  theory	  with	  
the	  case	  study	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  final	  chapter	  (8)	  ends	  with	  conclusions	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3	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
This	  chapter	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  background	  to	  this	  thesis	  empirical	  part.	  I	  will	  address	  two	  
strands	  of	  discourse,	  one	  highlighting	  water-­‐conflict	  and	  the	  other	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  
how	  trans-­‐boundary	  water	  resources	  may	  reduce	  conflict	  and	  contribute	  to	  benefit-­‐sharing.	  
Finally,	  I	  will	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  cooperation-­‐promoting	  factors	  that	  my	  empirical	  




3.1	  Water	  Scarcity	  and	  Conflict	  
	  
Inquitable	  access	  to	  water	  can	  trigger	  conflict,	  especially	  if	  the	  water	  is	  embedded	  in	  larger	  
conflicts	  of	  a	  high	  politics	  nature,	  or	  where	  limited	  economic	  diversification	  limits	  the	  range	  
of	  policy	  options	  open	  to	  governments11.	  Although	  wars	  over	  water	  have	  not	  occured,	  
existing	  research	  suggest	  that	  environmental	  scarcity	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  violent	  
conflict	  at	  the	  subnational	  level12.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  well	  established	  that	  unregulated	  access	  to	  common	  pool	  resources	  results	  in	  
unsustainable	  use,	  to	  the	  final	  disadvantage	  of	  all.	  The	  inevitable	  consequence	  is	  the	  
overexploitation	  of	  the	  resource,	  damaging	  the	  ecosystems	  and	  the	  services	  they	  provide13.	  
This	  theory	  corresponds	  well	  with	  Wallensteens	  definition	  of	  a	  conflict:	  ”a	  social	  situation	  in	  
which	  a	  minimum	  of	  two	  actors	  strive	  to	  aquire	  at	  the	  same	  moment	  in	  time	  an	  availalbe	  set	  
of	  scarce	  resources”14.	  A	  river	  basin	  is	  a	  common	  pool	  resource,	  meaning	  that	  use	  of	  it	  by	  
one	  rival	  will	  necessarily	  diminish	  the	  benefits	  available	  to	  others.	  In	  other	  words,	  water	  use	  
in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  basin	  creates	  external	  effects	  in	  other	  parts.	  If	  these	  externalities	  are	  not	  
”internalised”,	  the	  overall	  benefits	  are	  reduced	  and	  the	  outcome	  is	  sub-­‐optimal15.	  	  This	  is	  a	  
particular	  problem	  with	  transboundary	  waters	  because	  upstream	  partiers	  may	  overuse	  the	  
resource	  and	  downstream	  parties	  may	  be	  powerless	  to	  stop	  this,	  or	  to	  extract	  
compensation.	  The	  question,	  then,	  is	  how	  rivals	  to	  transboundary	  rivers	  arrive	  at	  seeing	  the	  
benefits	  from	  optimal	  water	  management,	  such	  that	  their	  interest	  coincide	  with	  
cooperation?	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  and	  under	  which	  conditions	  rivals	  co-­‐operate,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  
the	  theories	  which	  have	  been	  conducted	  about	  conflicts	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  scarcity	  of	  
resources.	  First	  of	  all,	  let	  us	  start	  with	  a	  few	  notes	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  scarcity.	  Scarcity	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Öjendal, Joakim., (2006), ”Transboundary Water Cooperation as a tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-Sharing”, Global Development Studies No.4, p.40. 
12 Conca, Ken & Dabelko Geoffrey., (2002), ”Environmental Peacemaking”, The John Hopkins University 
Press: Baltimore and London, p.231. 
13 Öjendal, Joakim et al., (2006), ”Transboundary Water cooperation as a tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-sharing”, Global Development Studies No.4, p.40. 
14 Wallensteen, Peter., (2005), ”Local conflict and water: addressing conflicts in water projects”, Swedish 
Water House, Stockholm p.9. 
15 Qaddumi, Halla., (2008), ”Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing”, Working Paper 292, 
Overseas Development Institute, p.1. 
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definition	  implies	  diminishing	  resources	  and/or	  a	  pressure	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  available	  
resources	  from	  an	  increasing	  demand.	  Attempts	  to	  overcome	  scarcities	  are	  sought	  through	  
two	  distinct	  mechanisms:	  supply-­‐side	  regulation	  and	  demand-­‐side	  regulation.	  Competition,	  
however,	  also	  entails	  a	  potential	  for	  conflict.	  Combined	  with	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  for	  
adapting	  to	  change	  we	  get	  the	  convenient	  four-­‐field	  diagram	  below16.	  	  
	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  Source:	  Ohlsson	  (1999,	  212)	  
	  
Following	  this	  analytical	  framework	  of	  Leif	  Ohlsson,	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that;	  3)	  
driving	  forces	  for	  conflicts	  within	  countries	  at	  present	  are	  attempts	  to	  increase	  supply,	  
resulting	  in	  competition	  between	  different	  sectors	  of	  society	  and	  different	  groups	  of	  
population;	  but	  that	  4)	  attempts	  to	  increase	  supply	  by	  necissity	  will	  be	  superseded	  by	  
demand	  regulation;	  and	  consequently	  from	  a	  policy	  point	  of	  view	  the	  most	  important	  
potential	  cause	  for	  conflicts	  over	  water	  will	  be	  mechanisms	  for	  conflict	  within	  countries	  
caused	  by	  the	  new	  demand	  management	  practices	  necessitated	  by	  water	  scarcity17.	  
From	  this	  analytical	  framework,	  one	  can	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  types	  of	  conflicts.	  
Ohlsson	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  first	  order	  conflicts,	  which	  are	  those	  resulting	  from	  
natural	  resource	  scarcity	  itself;	  and	  second	  order	  conflicts,	  which	  result	  from	  the	  adaptation	  
strategies	  by	  which	  societies	  try	  to	  overcome	  natural	  resource	  scarcity.	  	  
	  
	  
3.2	  Water,	  Cooperation	  and	  Sharing	  of	  Benefits	  
	  
The	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  identifies	  different	  categories	  of	  water	  conflicts	  and	  
their	  intensity.	  Over	  the	  last	  decade,	  however,	  views	  have	  begun	  to	  emphasizing	  
cooperation	  over	  scarce	  natural	  resources.	  Ken	  Conca	  highlights	  that	  common	  
environmental	  threats	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  positive	  interaction	  which	  builds	  trust	  between	  
adverse	  societies.	  He	  suggests	  two	  general	  pathways	  by	  which	  environmental	  cooperation	  
might	  occur:	  changing	  the	  strategic	  climtate	  and	  the	  strengthening	  post-­‐Westphalian	  
governance.	  Since	  the	  second	  pathway	  applies	  more	  to	  the	  regional	  and	  international	  level	  
than	  to	  the	  subnational,	  I	  will	  direct	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  cooperation-­‐promoting	  factors	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ohlsson, Leif., (1999), ” Water Scarcity and Conflict”, International Security Challenges in Changing World, 
Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy Volume 3, p.211. 
17 Ibid., p.212. 
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the	  first	  ”changing	  the	  strategic	  climate”	  pathway.	  Along	  this	  pathway,	  the	  premise	  of	  
environmental	  cooperation	  would	  alter	  these	  dynamics	  by	  the	  following	  means:	  
	  
• 	  Uncertainty	  reduction	  
• 	  Promotion	  of	  more	  diffuse	  forms	  of	  reciprocity	  
• Lengthening	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  Future	  
	  
First,	  with	  regard	  to	  uncertainty,	  which	  includes	  technical	  complexity	  and	  rival	  forms	  of	  
knowledge	  that	  make	  environmental	  cooperation	  difficult	  may	  also	  provide	  opportunities	  to	  
create	  new	  cooperative	  knowledge.	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  these	  collaborative	  opportunities	  
would	  give	  governments	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  economic	  and	  
ecological	  ties.	  For	  example,	  environmental	  cooperation	  typically	  requires	  sharing	  of	  
national	  data	  to	  construct	  a	  larger	  transboundary	  picture	  of	  a	  problem.	  These	  asymmetris	  in	  
information	  create	  oppurtunities	  for	  mutual	  gain.	  Moreover,	  environmental	  collaboration	  
can	  provide	  a	  low-­‐stakes	  arena	  in	  which	  governments	  can	  establish	  patterns	  of	  transparency	  
regarding	  their	  interests18.	  
	  
Second,	  Conca	  argues	  that	  environmental	  cooperation	  demands	  diffuse	  forms	  of	  reciprocity.	  
”Specific	  environmental	  problems	  typically	  involve	  upstream/downstream	  relationships	  or	  
other	  asymmetries	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  responsibilities	  and	  consequences.	  Even	  in	  the	  
Classic	  Case	  of	  a	  ”commons”	  or	  common	  property	  resource,	  it	  is	  rarely	  the	  case	  that	  all	  
actors	  bear	  identical	  responsibility	  for	  environmental	  damage	  or	  that	  the	  resulting	  losses	  will	  
be	  distributed	  in	  a	  purely	  symmetrical	  fashion.	  These	  asymmetries	  tend	  to	  create	  situations	  
in	  which	  different	  actors	  bring	  very	  different	  types	  of	  goods	  to	  the	  bargaining	  table:	  the	  basis	  
for	  cooperation	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  simply	  asking	  each	  other	  to	  contribute	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  and	  to	  accept	  the	  same	  benefits.”19	  By	  this	  reasoning,	  overlapping	  ecosystemic	  
interdependencies	  provide	  a	  chance	  to	  create	  opportunities	  for	  shared	  gains	  and	  establish	  a	  
tradition	  of	  cooperation.	  
	  
	  
Third,	  a	  longer	  shadow	  of	  the	  future	  is	  when	  actors	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  future,	  when	  
they	  value	  it	  more	  relative	  to	  present,	  and	  when	  they	  expect	  to	  engage	  in	  sustained	  
interaction	  with	  one	  another.	  Even	  though	  short	  time	  horizons	  are	  common	  as	  power	  and	  
profit	  ofthen	  are	  significant	  aspects	  for	  those	  in	  power,	  environemental	  collaboration	  can	  
lengthening	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  future	  if	  the	  actors	  establishes	  dynamic	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  
that	  promises	  future	  benefits.	  Since	  environmental	  problems	  are	  future	  bound	  and	  
surrounded	  with	  uncertainty,	  environmental	  cooperation	  provide	  public	  goods	  that	  will	  pay	  
a	  stream	  of	  future	  benefits	  on	  a	  joint	  investment	  made	  today20.	  These	  circumstances	  push	  
actors	  to	  extend	  the	  time	  horizon	  that	  frames	  the	  bargaining	  process.	  
	  
As	  explained	  earlier,	  uncertainty	  is	  central	  to	  environmental	  policy.	  For	  most	  environmental	  
problems,	  we	  have	  very	  limited	  knowledge	  of	  the	  underlying	  physical	  or	  ecological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Conca, Ken., (2001) ”Environmental Cooperation and International Peace” in Diehl, P. F. and Gleditsch, N. 
P., ”Environmental Conflict”, Westview Press: Boulder and Oxford, pp.230-232	  
19 Ibid., p.234 
20 Ibid., p.236 
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processes,	  the	  economic	  impacts	  of	  environmental	  change,	  and	  the	  possible	  technological	  
changes	  that	  might	  occur	  and	  ameliorate	  the	  economic	  impacts	  and/or	  reduce	  policy	  
costs21.	  	  These	  structural	  factors	  determines	  political	  actors	  discretions	  and	  shapes	  their	  
policy	  options	  which	  can	  be	  both	  obstacles	  and	  opportunities	  towards	  cooperation.	  Put	  it	  
another	  way	  –	  uncertainty	  can	  make	  the	  actors	  to	  choose	  to	  continue	  on	  the	  path	  that	  
involves	  unilateral	  action,	  or	  it	  can	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  cooperation.	  The	  role	  of	  
uncertainty	  in	  policy	  design	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  environmental	  problems	  that	  involve	  
long	  time	  horizons.	  Long	  time	  horizon	  exacerbates	  the	  uncertainty	  over	  policy	  costs	  and	  
benefits.	  For	  policy	  makers	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  justify	  almost	  any	  policy	  that	  imposes	  costs	  
on	  society	  today	  but	  yields	  benefits	  only	  10	  to	  20	  years	  from	  now,	  so	  the	  size	  of	  the	  time	  
horizon	  can	  be	  the	  make	  or	  break	  factor	  in	  policy	  evaluation22.	  We	  can	  therefore	  argue	  than	  
an	  important	  dimension	  of	  collective-­‐action	  problems23	  relating	  to	  water	  utilization	  is	  that	  
the	  prospects	  for	  cooperation	  increases	  if	  parties	  sharing	  resources	  interacts	  over	  a	  long	  
period	  of	  time,	  an	  interaction	  that	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  future.	  If	  the	  shadow	  of	  
the	  future	  is	  high	  enough	  (the	  actor	  assign	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  value	  to	  the	  expected	  payoffs	  
from	  future	  collective-­‐arrangements),	  then	  each	  actor	  is	  expected	  to	  choose	  the	  strategy	  of	  
conditional	  cooperation24.	  
To	  solve	  the	  collective-­‐action	  problem	  the	  concept	  of	  benefit	  sharing	  has	  been	  proposed	  as	  
one	  approach	  to	  bypass	  the	  competing	  claims	  for	  transboundary	  water	  resources.	  The	  idea	  
with	  benefit	  sharing	  is	  that	  if	  the	  focus	  is	  switched	  from	  physical	  volumes	  of	  water	  to	  the	  
various	  values	  derived	  from	  water	  use	  –	  including	  economic,	  political	  and	  environmental	  –	  
riparians	  will	  correctly	  view	  the	  problem	  as	  one	  of	  positive-­‐sum	  outcomes	  associated	  with	  
optimising	  benefits	  rather	  than	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  outcomes	  associated	  with	  dividing	  water25.	  In	  
the	  case	  studies	  of	  the	  report	  ”Transboundary	  Water	  cooperation	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  Conflict	  
Prevention	  and	  for	  Broader	  Benefit-­‐sharing”,	  the	  authors	  follow	  the	  framework	  of	  Sadoff	  
and	  Grey	  (2002)	  when	  analyzing	  benefit-­‐sharing	  in	  transboundary	  river	  basins.	  They	  identify	  
three	  broad	  sets	  of	  benefits	  which	  are	  key	  motivating	  factors	  for	  decision	  makers:	  
	  
	  
• In	  the	  security	  arena,	  transboundary	  water	  management	  –	  river	  basin	  
authorities	  with	  clear	  legal	  and	  organizational	  structures	  -­‐	  can	  provide	  a	  
platform	  for	  that	  civilization	  by	  reducing	  uncertainty	  and	  increasing	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Pindyck, Robert S., (2007) ”Uncertainty in Environmental Economics”, Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy, volume 1, issue 1, pp.62. 
22 Ibid., p.60 
23	  Defined as two rivals drawing water from a shared lake or river, and the resource is polluted and that each 
actor can clean it up unilaterally. Each actor prefers that the other do it, but the second-best preference is that 
they cooperate in cleaning it so that the the resource becomes usable again. For a further discussion on 
collective-action problems see: Benvenisti, Eyal., (1996) ” Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared 
Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law”, The American Journal of International 
law, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp.390. 
24 Ibid., p.391. 
25 Qaddumi, Halla., (2008). ”Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing”, Working Paper 
292, Overseas Development Institute, p.1. 
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assurance	  of	  supply	  needed	  for	  future	  prosperity.	  For	  example,	  benefits	  may	  
include	  reduced	  effects	  of	  hydrologic	  variability,	  flood	  and	  drought	  
mitigation26.	  
	  
• Economic	  development:	  The	  framing	  of	  the	  logic	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
economic	  development	  means	  that	  common	  currency	  can	  be	  found	  via	  
trade-­‐	  offs	  that	  lead	  to	  benefit-­‐sharing.	  In	  the	  economic	  sphere,	  a	  well-­‐
managed	  watershed	  will	  provide	  enhanced	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  trade,	  food	  
production	  and	  livelihoods27.	  For	  example,	  the	  immediate	  benefits	  of	  
cooperation	  might	  be	  reduced	  costs	  associated	  with	  flood	  control;	  the	  
medium-­‐run	  benefits,	  increased	  agricultural	  yields.	  
	  
• In	  the	  environmental	  sphere,	  water	  is	  foundation	  for	  all	  sustainable	  
economic	  activities,	  with	  strong	  contributing	  factors	  to	  social	  stability	  and	  
human	  well-­‐being.	  Benefits	  that	  cooperation	  could	  bring	  is	  improved	  
environmental	  management	  and	  increased	  system-­‐wide	  yields	  of	  water.	  All	  
of	  these	  have	  economy-­‐wide	  impacts,	  directly	  affecting	  productive	  output.	  
For	  example,	  where	  rainfall	  is	  highly	  variable	  and	  riparians	  lack	  credible	  
commitments,	  investment	  patterns	  will	  reflect	  risk-­‐adverse	  behaviour	  as	  
water	  users	  attempt	  to	  cope	  with	  uncertain	  supplies.	  Farmers	  will	  be	  hesitant	  
to	  invest	  in	  land	  improvements	  and	  capital-­‐intensive	  production	  technologies	  
if	  there	  are	  no	  cooperative	  agreements	  with	  equitable	  utilization	  of	  the	  
common	  water	  resource	  within	  a	  basin28.	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  Öjendal	  et	  al.	  conclude	  that	  a	  well-­‐managed	  watershed	  can	  provide	  enhanced	  
benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  Security,	  Economic	  development	  and	  the	  Environment	  –	  but	  maintains	  
that	  benefit-­‐sharing	  would	  be	  impossible	  without	  institutions29.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  Aaron	  T.	  
Wolf	  argues	  that	  levels	  of	  conflict	  or	  cooperation	  are	  largely	  determined	  by	  the	  institutional	  
capacity	  within	  a	  basin.	  As	  stated	  by	  Wolf:	  ”The	  likelihood	  and	  intensity	  of	  conflict	  rises	  as	  




I	  have	  now	  quite	  extensively	  described	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  theories	  on	  water	  
cooperation.	  The	  question	  then	  is	  how	  the	  theories	  could	  be	  of	  use	  in	  my	  empirical	  study	  on	  
transboundary	  water	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing.	  My	  starting	  point	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Öjendal, Joakim et al., (2006), ”Transboundary Water cooperation as a tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-sharing”, Global Development Studies No.4, p.174.	  
27 Ibid., p.38. 
28 Qaddumi, Halla., (2008). ”Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing”, Working Paper 
292, Overseas Development Institute, p.4. 
29 Öjendal, Joakim et al., (2006), ”Transboundary Water cooperation as a tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-sharing”, Global Development Studies No.4, p.175. 
30 Wolf, T. Aaron., (2001). ” Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned”, Secretariat of the 
International Conference on Freshwater – Bonn 2001, p.10. 
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to	  direct	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  the	  three	  cooperation-­‐promoting	  factors	  in	  Ken	  Concas	  
”changing	  the	  strategic	  climate”	  pathway,	  which	  will	  be	  a	  part	  of	  my	  analysis	  protocol.	  First,	  
rivals	  in	  a	  river	  basin	  will	  cooperate	  if	  they	  have	  mutual	  interests	  and	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  
coordinating	  their	  actions.	  Common	  interest,	  such	  as	  alleviating	  water	  scarcity,	  can	  provide	  
actors	  with	  greater	  transparency,	  lower	  transaction	  costs	  through	  uncertainty	  reduction	  
which	  is	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  compared	  to	  gains	  associated	  with	  a	  non-­‐cooperative	  behavior	  
where	  actors	  attempt	  to	  cope	  with	  uncertain	  supplies.	  Secondly,	  cooperation	  is	  facilitated	  
when	  a	  actor	  experiencing	  water	  scarcity	  provides	  side	  payments	  to	  the	  other	  party	  as	  an	  
incentive.	  Interdependence	  is	  a	  motivation	  for	  cooperation	  since	  it	  facilitate	  a	  type	  of	  
relationship	  in	  which	  neither	  rival	  may	  act	  without	  some	  type	  of	  coordination	  with	  the	  other	  
party.	  The	  important	  lesson	  is	  that	  cooperation	  may	  emerge	  despite	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  
rivals,	  provided	  that	  the	  interdependence	  of	  the	  parties	  induces	  them	  to	  exchange	  data,	  
coordinate	  their	  policies,	  and	  abide	  their	  agreements.	  Third,	  water	  scarcity	  extends	  the	  time	  
horizons	  rivals	  consider	  in	  their	  dealings.	  Intergovernments,	  like	  in	  my	  case,	  will	  act	  in	  a	  
long-­‐term	  way	  if	  high	  costs	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  promises	  future	  profits	  which	  outweigh	  these	  
costs.	  Environmental	  problems	  such	  as	  water	  scarcity	  change	  actors	  ”mental	  maps”	  by	  
forcing	  decision	  makers	  to	  think	  about	  future	  generations.	  
	  
In	  my	  view,	  all	  three	  factors	  are	  in	  line	  with	  Nobel	  Price	  winner	  Elinor	  Ostroms	  eight	  
management	  principles.	  In	  her	  book	  ”	  Governing	  the	  commons,	  the	  evolution	  of	  Institutions	  
for	  Collective	  action”,	  she	  raises	  the	  question	  under	  which	  conditions	  groups	  of	  users	  can	  be	  
expected	  to	  cooperate	  and	  to	  internalize	  transboundary	  externalities	  and	  how	  institutions	  
must	  be	  shaped	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  cooperation	  about.	  She	  illustrates	  eight	  principles	  on	  the	  
managing	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resources:	  
	  
1. Clearly	  defined	  boundaries	  
2. Congruence	  between	  appropriation	  and	  provision	  rules	  and	  local	  conditions	  
3. Collective-­‐choice	  arrangements	  
4. Monitoring	  
5. Graduated	  sanctions	  
6. Conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms	  
7. Minimal	  recognition	  of	  rights	  to	  organize	  
8. Nested	  enterprises31	  
	  
In	  my	  own	  list	  down	  below,	  I	  will	  place	  emphasis	  on	  two	  of	  her	  principles.	  Like	  I	  have	  said	  
earlier,	  interdependence	  provides	  the	  main	  motivation	  to	  cooperate,	  but	  fears	  of	  cheating	  
must	  be	  overcome	  for	  cooperative	  arrangements	  to	  ensue	  and	  subsequently	  hold.	  Similarly,	  
Ostrom	  has	  argued	  that	  cooperation	  depends	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  
among	  groups	  of	  users–	  that	  reduces	  uncertainty	  and	  increase	  transparency32.	  In	  terms	  of	  
Ostrom´s	  principles,	  principle	  (4)	  monitoring	  and	  (6)	  conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms	  are	  
important	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  my	  study.	  A	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  transboundary	  
cooperation	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  joint	  monitoring,	  which	  requires	  parties	  to	  define	  
common	  information	  needs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  water	  management	  policies.	  Principle	  (4)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ostrom, Elinor., (1990), ”Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action”, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, p.90. 
32	  Ibid., p.33-36. 
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means	  in	  practice	  that	  I	  assume	  that	  those	  who	  have	  the	  supervising	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  
Hai	  river	  basin	  concerning	  the	  water	  resource	  must	  act	  according	  to	  laws	  and	  rules.	  There	  
are	  always	  users	  who	  sees	  an	  opportunity	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  obligations	  that	  are	  part	  of	  
the	  system.	  If	  the	  users	  included	  in	  Hai	  river	  basin	  shall	  follow	  the	  rules,	  there	  must	  be	  
conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms	  (6)	  in	  a	  simple	  way	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  arising	  from	  water	  
issues.	  With	  regard	  to	  conflict	  prevention,	  transboundary	  water	  cooperation	  is	  facilitated	  
when	  there	  are	  institutions	  that	  can	  reduce	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  conflicts	  concerning	  
distribution	  and	  use	  by	  promoting	  for	  peaceful	  conflict	  settlement.	  Principle	  (4)	  and	  (6)	  on	  
Ostroms	  list	  will	  therefore	  be	  an	  important	  guidance	  for	  my	  work.	  
	  
The	  five	  factors	  I	  have	  now	  put	  forward	  will	  be	  on	  my	  analytical	  framework	  on	  page	  16.	  	  For	  
my	  own	  part,	  I	  am	  prepared	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  empirical	  data	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  mechanism	  
that	  I	  have	  not	  included	  on	  my	  analytical	  framework.	  The	  empirical	  test	  is	  therefore	  superior	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4	  Research	  Design	  
This	  chapter	  provide	  the	  reader	  with	  some	  information	  about	  the	  research	  design	  of	  the	  
paper.	  I	  will	  start	  off	  with	  defining	  the	  variables	  and	  outline	  the	  research	  question	  that	  are	  
to	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  study.	  This	  chapter	  then	  deals	  with	  selection	  of	  case,	  choice	  of	  
research	  method	  and	  implications	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  research	  has	  on	  the	  possibility	  to	  




In	  order	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcities	  lead	  to	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei	  
province	  and	  Beijing	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin	  –	  some	  general	  definitions	  have	  to	  be	  made.	  
	  




• Water	  Scarcity:	  In	  this	  study,	  a	  community	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  scarce	  supplies	  of	  
water	  if	  the	  annual	  availability	  of	  water	  is	  1,000	  cubic	  meters	  or	  less	  per	  person.	  In	  
volumetric	  terms,	  1000	  m3	  per	  capita/year	  is	  taken	  as	  threshold	  for	  water	  scarcity,	  
and	  500	  m3	  per	  capita/year	  is	  used	  as	  the	  threshold	  for	  ”absolute	  water	  scarcity”.	  
This	  follow	  the	  proposals	  of	  Öjendal	  et	  al33.	  
	  
Dependent	  variables:	  
• Cooperation:	  May	  be	  an	  arrangement	  between	  two	  governments	  for	  accomplishing	  a	  
common	  goal	  or	  solving	  a	  mutual	  problem.	  
	  
	  
4.2	  Research	  Questions	  
	  
In	  section	  2.2	  above,	  I	  fully	  described	  my	  overall	  research	  problems.	  My	  primary	  research	  
problem	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcity	  lead	  to	  cooperation	  between	  the	  
intergovernments	  located	  in	  the	  same	  river	  basin.	  This	  research	  problem	  relates	  in	  
particular	  to	  the	  causal	  question,	  in	  other	  words:	  
	  
-­‐	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  that	  self-­‐interested	  intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  province	  and	  
Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  collaborating	  on	  scarce	  water	  resources?	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  solve	  my	  primary	  research	  problem	  I	  have	  presented	  a	  list	  of	  factors	  for	  
cooperation	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  exhaustive.	  It	  should	  be	  inserted	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  
following	  list	  is	  not	  exhaustively	  describing	  all	  cooperation-­‐promoting	  factors	  that	  exists	  in	  
the	  field.	  	  My	  analytical	  framework	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  my	  work	  but	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  I	  am	  ”locked”	  to	  it.	  Rather	  I	  will	  have	  an	  open	  approach	  to	  find	  other	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  
field	  that	  are	  not	  included	  on	  my	  list.	  The	  empirical	  material	  is	  crucial	  and	  can	  backfire.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Öjendal, Joakim et al., (2006), ”Transboundary Water cooperation as a tool for Conflict Prevention and for 
Broader Benefit-sharing”, Global Development Studies No.4, p.24. 
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  Analytical	  framework	  
	   Further	  explanation	   Yes	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1. Reciprocal	  interdependence	  
	  
	  
	   	  






















Are	  both	  intergovernments	  in	  a	  
situation	  where	  they	  can	  attain	  
mutually	  payoffs	  from	  cooperation?	  
	  
Is	  there	  more	  trust	  and	  less	  uncertainty	  
now	  than	  earlier	  between	  Hebei	  
province	  and	  Beijing?	  	  
	  
Are	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  
perceiving	  themselves	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  
relationship	  that	  promises	  future	  
benefits?	  Is	  the	  water	  scarcity	  forcing	  
the	  intergovernments	  to	  think	  about	  
future	  generations?	  
Does	  the	  monitoring	  system	  has	  the	  
adequate	  capacity	  for	  managing	  water	  
resources	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin?	  
	  
Are	  there	  any	  mechanisms	  for	  
discussing	  and	  resolving	  conflictual	  
water	  issues	  between	  Hebei	  province	  
and	  Beijing?	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4.3	  Selection	  of	  Case	  
	  
The	  survey	  will	  revolve	  around	  one	  case.	  If	  a	  survey	  of	  such	  a	  character	  should	  have	  any	  
general	  scientific	  interest	  the	  case	  must	  point	  out	  of	  itself.	  	  A	  common	  -­‐	  and	  reasonable	  –	  
requirement	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  clear	  “what	  the	  study	  is	  a	  case	  of”.	  If	  this	  requirement	  is	  met	  
the	  study	  is	  placed	  into	  an	  existing	  scientific	  context.	  What	  shall	  we	  then	  say	  that	  this	  study	  
is	  a	  case	  of?	  To	  think	  in	  these	  terms	  is	  useful	  when	  planning	  your	  study,	  but	  you	  have	  to	  be	  
explicit	  and	  systematic	  in	  determining	  this	  status.	  
	  
As	  for	  my	  primary	  research	  problem,	  the	  water-­‐relationship	  between	  upstream	  Hebei	  
province	  and	  downstream	  Beijing	  in	  the	  Hai	  river	  basin	  is	  my	  focus	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  
literature	  on	  natural	  resource	  management	  in	  shared	  river	  basins	  comprises	  many	  
important	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  specify	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  groups	  of	  users	  will	  
cooperate	  or	  fight	  over	  resources	  upon	  which	  they	  depend.	  Shared	  river	  basins	  (such	  as	  Hai	  
river	  basin)	  present	  conditions	  similar	  to	  those	  that	  make	  river	  water	  so	  susceptible	  to	  
conflict.	  With	  specific	  regard	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  violent	  conflict	  arising	  from	  scarcity	  of	  water	  
resources,	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  constitutes	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  norm	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  
categorized	  as	  a	  deviant	  case	  compared	  to	  the	  environmental-­‐conflict	  thesis.	  This	  study	  
explores	  how	  and	  why	  this	  case	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  theorized	  trajectory	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
there	  is	  cooperation	  when	  we	  should	  expect	  conflict.	  Regarding	  my	  primary	  research	  
problem	  I	  therefore	  meet	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  deviant	  case	  since	  I	  cast	  light	  on	  the	  
exceptional	  and	  the	  untypical	  in	  this	  research	  area.	  
There	  are	  good	  arguments	  for	  selecting	  deviant	  cases.	  If	  we	  analyze	  such	  a	  case	  and	  identify	  
the	  underlying	  causes,	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  theoretical	  propositions	  we	  
reach	  have	  general	  aspects	  that	  can	  also	  say	  something	  interesting	  about	  other	  cases	  in	  the	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4.4	  Method	  
	  
The	  criticisms	  of	  Thomas	  Homer	  Dixon	  and	  the	  Toronto	  Group´s	  findings	  have	  been	  
particularly	  on	  methodological	  grounds.	  Gleditsch	  claims,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  Toronto	  
Group	  fails	  to	  select	  cases	  appropriately	  by	  choosing	  cases	  in	  which	  both	  the	  independent	  
(environmental	  scarcity)	  and	  dependent	  variable	  (conflict)	  were	  known	  a	  priori	  to	  exist.	  
Gleditsch	  additionally	  contends	  that	  this	  methodological	  approach	  violates	  a	  fundamental	  
principle	  of	  research	  design	  that	  applies	  to	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analyses34.	  	  
Consequently,	  With	  this	  knowledge	  at	  hand	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  work	  with	  a	  case	  study	  of	  
qualitative	  nature	  since	  this	  method	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  appropriate	  when	  
analyzing	  a	  contemporary	  event	  or	  process	  such	  as	  water	  scarcity	  leading	  to	  cooperation35.	  
Indeed,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  whether	  there	  are	  causal	  links	  between	  water	  scarcity	  and	  
cooperation	  -­‐	  and	  if	  there	  are,	  how	  and	  why	  these	  links	  work	  -­‐	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  use	  the	  
single-­‐case	  method	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  demonstrate	  causality.	  Using	  a	  process	  tracing	  approach,	  I	  
will	  then	  go	  through	  my	  case	  and	  sum	  up	  with	  an	  analyze.	  Methodologically,	  process	  tracing	  
serves	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  attempts	  to	  identify	  the	  intervening	  causal	  mechanism	  between	  an	  
independent	  variable	  (water	  scarcity)	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  
(cooperation)36.	  	  For	  my	  own	  part,	  I	  believe	  an	  inductive	  observation	  of	  apparent	  causal	  
mechanisms	  are	  most	  appropriate	  because	  my	  case	  is	  a	  deviant	  case.	  This	  approach,	  
process	  induction,	  is	  suited	  to	  the	  study	  of	  cases	  that	  have	  outcomes	  that	  are	  not	  predicted	  
or	  explained	  adequately	  by	  existing	  theories37.	  With	  this	  case-­‐study	  method	  (involving	  
process-­‐tracing)	  I	  want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcity	  lead	  to	  cooperation	  by	  
tracing	  the	  causal	  mechanisms.	  
	  
I	  will	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  design.	  My	  case	  are	  analyzed	  
through	  a	  8	  weeks	  field	  trip	  to	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei,	  where	  I	  will	  talk	  to	  people	  from	  a	  broad	  
spectra	  of	  stakeholders,	  officials	  and	  researchers	  as	  practically	  possible.	  Moreover,	  to	  easily	  
gain	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  cooperation	  in	  the	  area,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  specifically	  look	  at	  the	  
situation	  in	  Beijing	  Municipality	  and	  Zhangjiakou	  city	  in	  Hebei.	  	  
	  
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  will	  be	  conducted	  with	  a	  fairly	  open	  framework	  which	  allows	  for	  
two-­‐way	  communication.	  Using	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews,	  I	  can	  easily	  ask	  supplementary	  
questions,	  deepen	  the	  discussion	  and	  develop	  the	  answers	  given.	  The	  information	  obtained	  
from	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  will	  not	  just	  provide	  me	  with	  answers,	  but	  the	  reasons	  for	  
the	  answers	  which	  helps	  me	  to	  trace	  the	  causal	  mechanisms.	  Even	  though	  the	  analyze	  of	  
the	  case	  is	  based	  on	  different	  kinds	  of	  data	  from	  different	  people,	  the	  same	  general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Homer-Dixon T.F., (2000), ” The Environment and Violent Conflict: A response to Gleditsch´s Critique and 
some suggestions for Future Research”, Environment Change and Security Project Report. Issue 6, p.85.	  
35 Yin, R.K., (1994) ”Case Study Research: Design and Methods”, Sage: London, p.23	  
36 George, Alexander L & Bennet, Andrew., (2005), ” Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, MIT press p.206. 
37 George, Alexander L & Bennet, Andrew., (1997), ” Process Tracing in Case Study Research”, paper 
presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, MIT press. Available online at 
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm 
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I	  will	  now	  investigate	  the	  issue	  of	  generalisation,	  since	  this	  is	  the	  issue	  over	  which	  case	  study	  
methodology	  has	  been	  most	  questioned.	  How	  are	  generalisations	  made	  from	  a	  single	  case?	  
The	  possibility	  to	  say	  something	  about	  how	  and	  why	  water	  scarcity	  lead	  to	  cooperation	  in	  
Chinese	  river	  basins	  in	  general	  is	  sharply	  reduced	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  cases.	  Although	  a	  
qualitative	  case	  study	  never	  can	  be	  representative	  in	  a	  statistical	  sense,	  and	  thereby	  be	  
criticized	  for	  not	  allowing	  for	  generalizations	  to	  be	  made,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  my	  
generalized	  ambitions	  are	  being	  undermined.	  A	  theory-­‐realted	  analytic	  generalization	  can	  
be	  made	  through	  induction38.	  In	  my	  case	  this	  is	  done	  through	  inductive	  theory-­‐generation,	  
or	  conceptualization,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  data	  from	  within	  a	  case.	  By	  identifying	  facts	  in	  my	  
case	  I	  can	  develop	  a	  theory,	  consisting	  of	  a	  set	  of	  related	  concepts,	  in	  which	  generalisations	  
are	  made.	  
	  
Before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  empirical	  section	  something	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  criteria	  for	  
drawing	  conclusions.	  Based	  on	  my	  analytical	  framework	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  criteria	  I	  
need	  to	  think	  about.	  First,	  I	  need	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  of	  occurence	  of	  each	  indicator	  in	  the	  
analytical	  framework.	  Secondly,	  I	  need	  to	  decide	  how	  many	  indicators	  I	  need	  to	  find	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  theory	  is	  supported	  or	  not.	  Since	  my	  study	  is	  of	  qualitative	  nature	  the	  indicators	  
rests	  on	  reasonable	  thinking	  rather	  than	  absolute	  and	  quantitative	  criteria.	  I	  will	  therefore	  
carefully	  consider	  each	  factor	  in	  the	  analytical	  framework	  and	  base	  my	  conclusions	  on	  those	  
factors	  which	  stands	  out	  and	  differs	  from	  the	  amount	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  receive	  more	  
















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Johansson, Rolf., (2003), ”Case Study Methodology”, Methodologies in Housing Research organised by the 
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm p.8. Available online at 
http://www.infra.kth.se/BBA/IAPS%20PDF/paper%20Rolf%20Johansson%20ver%202.pdf 
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5	  Bureaucratic	  Structures	  on	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  
This	  chapter	  deals	  entirely	  with	  the	  institutional	  and	  legal	  factors	  that	  hamper	  the	  Chinese	  
government	  from	  being	  successful	  in	  water	  management	  and	  pollution	  control.	  I	  will	  
specifically	  adress	  the	  water	  challenges	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  the	  River	  Basin	  Commissions	  
critical	  role	  on	  water	  management.	  On	  page	  23,	  there	  is	  a	  figure	  of	  Chinas	  Water	  
Management	  Apparatus,	  which	  will	  give	  the	  reader	  a	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  country´s	  
political	  structure	  concerning	  water	  issues.	  
	  
	  
”By	  understanding	  the	  governmental	  structure	  of	  China,	  we	  can	  start	  to	  understand	  why	  
China	  is	  facing	  a	  water	  crisis.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  Interview	  4	  
	  
	  
5.1	  Legal	  and	  Institutional	  Background	  
	  
First,	  China	  is	  a	  country	  where	  the	  rights	  are	  centralized	  in	  the	  central	  government,	  that	  is	  
the	  main	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government.	  Under	  the	  Constitution,	  ownership	  of	  
water	  resources	  is	  exercised	  mainly	  through	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  as	  an	  organ	  of	  
the	  State	  Council	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  people39.	  The	  legal	  framework	  and	  institutional	  
arrangements	  for	  water	  management	  has	  developed	  mainly	  within	  the	  past	  20	  years.	  
Currently,	  China	  is	  undergoing	  a	  transition	  from	  “rule	  by	  law”	  to	  “rule	  of	  law”.	  Historically,	  
Chinese	  law	  has	  been	  based	  on	  “punishment”	  by	  which	  a	  ruler	  governs	  the	  governed	  (“rule	  
by	  man”)40.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  “rule	  of	  law”	  is	  a	  western	  concept	  in	  which	  laws	  regulate	  
the	  behavior	  of	  officials	  and	  “assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  rights”,	  and	  is	  fundamentally	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  traditional	  way	  of	  Chinese	  thinking.	  Although	  the	  “rule	  of	  law”	  has	  
been	  adopted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  legal	  framework	  in	  the	  last	  twenty	  years,	  laws	  are	  still	  
widely	  seen	  in	  China	  as	  giving	  “power”	  to	  a	  ministry.	  As	  a	  result,	  ministries	  may	  draft	  laws	  in	  
their	  area	  of	  competence	  and	  this	  process	  results	  in	  laws	  by	  ministries	  for	  ministries,	  which	  
provides	  specific	  powers	  for	  the	  ministry	  concerned.	  Hence,	  there	  is	  a	  Water	  Pollution	  
Protection	  and	  Control	  (WPPC)	  Law	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environmental	  Protection	  (MEP)	  and	  
the	  Water	  Law	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  (MWR).	  Much	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  faces	  
these	  two	  ministries	  arises	  from	  the	  concept	  that	  “power”	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  ministry	  by	  virtue	  
of	  “their”	  law,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  western	  context	  where	  power	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  law	  which	  
may	  be	  exercised	  by	  specific	  ministries	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  other	  laws	  and	  other	  
ministries41.	  
	  
This	  concept	  of	  “power”	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  their	  governmental	  structure	  which	  at	  first	  
glimpse	  gives	  an	  impression	  of	  a	  system	  that	  is	  hierarchically	  clearly	  defined,	  with	  core	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Interview 4; 15/04/2010 
40 Wang, Xuejun & Ongley, Edwin., (2004), ”Transboundary Water Pollution Management in China: The Legal 
and Institutional Framework”, Water International, Volume 29, p. 271 
41 Ibid., p.272 
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leadership	  at	  the	  top	  and	  individuals	  linked	  to	  vertical	  ministries	  that	  control	  units	  from	  the	  
centre	  to	  the	  local	  level.	  However,	  this	  hierarchical	  chain	  of	  organisation	  in	  the	  water	  
management	  system	  is	  actually	  characterized	  by	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  fragmentation42.	  
Horizontally,	  at	  every	  level	  of	  government	  several	  institutions	  are	  involved	  in	  water	  
management.	  At	  the	  central	  level,	  the	  NPC	  (National	  People	  ́s	  Congress)	  and	  the	  State	  
Council	  play	  an	  overarching	  role	  through	  enactment	  of	  laws/regulations	  and	  supervising	  
their	  implementation	  and	  coordination.	  Within	  this	  system,	  there	  are	  from	  the	  central	  level	  
conflicts	  in	  responsibilities	  mainly	  between	  MWR	  and	  MEP	  since	  they	  don’t	  know	  which	  
problem	  should	  be	  treated	  by	  which	  department43.	  For	  example,	  even	  though	  water	  quality	  
and	  quantity	  management	  are	  integrated	  issues	  they	  are	  separated	  from	  each	  other	  and	  put	  
under	  MEP	  and	  MWR.	  The	  MWR	  is	  responsible	  for	  water	  allocation	  planning	  and	  water	  
rights	  administration,	  whereas	  MEP	  is	  responsible	  for	  water	  quality-­‐	  such	  as	  pollution	  
prevention	  and	  control.	  The	  State	  Council	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  severity	  of	  this	  institutional	  
fragmentation	  and	  has	  promoted	  institutional	  transformation	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  integrated	  
issues44.	  
However,	  this	  two	  track	  system	  is	  replicated	  at	  the	  local	  (province,	  prefecture,	  county)	  level.	  
Water	  resource	  bureaus	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  and	  water	  affairs	  bureaus	  (WAB)	  at	  the	  
municipal	  level,	  which	  are	  overseen	  by	  MWR	  at	  the	  central	  level,	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  
administration	  of	  water	  rights,	  the	  planning	  and	  operation	  of	  water	  utilities,	  and	  the	  
protection	  of	  water	  bodies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  water	  function	  zones.	  Environmental	  protection	  
bureaus	  (EPBs)	  overseen	  by	  MEP	  are	  responsible	  for	  issuing	  pollution	  permits,	  controlling	  
pollution,	  and	  protection	  of	  water	  bodies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  environmental	  water	  zones45.	  
Vertically,	  the	  water	  management	  system	  is	  also	  fragmented.	  This	  existing	  regime	  of	  water	  
resource	  management	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  administrative	  boundaries	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  
government	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  river	  basin	  level.	  A	  ministry	  or	  a	  commission	  has	  the	  same	  
administrative	  rank	  (buji)	  as	  a	  provincial-­‐level	  government,	  which	  means	  that	  a	  ministry	  
cannot	  tell	  a	  provincial	  government	  what	  to	  do.	  These	  functional	  units	  exist	  at	  the	  vertical	  
chain	  through	  successively	  lower	  territorial	  levels	  of	  government.	  Individual	  functional	  units	  
within	  this	  system	  receive	  administration	  guidance	  from	  their	  parent	  units	  above	  them;	  they	  
are	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  local	  governments	  to	  which	  they	  belong;	  but	  
communication	  between	  functional	  units	  at	  the	  same	  territorial	  level	  has	  been	  very	  
limited46.	  
One	  of	  the	  aspects	  that	  arises	  when	  studying	  legal	  and	  institutional	  issues	  in	  China	  is	  the	  
importance	  of	  social	  stability,	  and	  how	  it	  influence	  policymaking.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  positive	  
political	  component,	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  excessive	  secrecy,	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  arbitrary	  use	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Heggelund, Gorild., (2004), ”Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges Project”, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited: England, p.50 
43 Interview 2; 08/04/2010 
44 Ibid., 
45 The World Bank., (2009), ”Addressing China´s Water Scarcity: A Synthesis of Recommendations for Selected 
Water Resource Management Issues”, p.19. Available online at http://books.google.se 
46 Gang, Chen., (2009), ” Politics of Chinas Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress”, World 
Scientific Publishing CO: Singapore, p.19 
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of	  authority47.	  A	  key	  to	  transforming	  Chinas	  water	  crisis	  may	  be	  using	  water	  more	  efficiently	  
by	  public	  participation,	  but	  the	  potential	  for	  unnecessary	  social	  unrest	  created	  by	  
environmental	  activists	  means	  that	  green	  movements	  rarely	  coincide	  with	  existing	  political	  
boundaries.	  The	  prognosis	  might	  change,	  however,	  since	  China	  is	  permitting	  the	  formation	  
of	  social	  movements	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  become	  legal	  entities	  by	  registering	  with	  the	  
government48.	  Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  explain	  Chinas	  local	  environmental	  protection	  apparatus.	  
	  
5.2	  Weakness	  in	  Local	  Environmental	  Protection	  Departments	  
Besides	  the	  central	  level,	  environmental	  protection	  bureaus	  at	  various	  local	  levels	  are	  also	  in	  
a	  disadvantageous	  position	  when	  performing	  their	  duties.	  In	  all	  cases,	  it	  is	  the	  local	  
government,	  not	  the	  higher	  levels	  of	  the	  environmental	  protection	  apparatus,	  that	  provides	  
local	  environmental	  agencies	  with	  their	  annual	  budgetary	  funds.	  Thus,	  the	  ability	  of	  EPBs	  or	  
WABs	  to	  enforce	  laws	  is	  compromised	  by	  their	  dependency	  on	  local	  government	  for	  their	  
authority	  and	  budget.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising,	  therefore,	  that	  there	  are	  many	  complaints	  about	  
the	  inadequacy	  of	  pollution	  or	  water	  saving	  enforcements	  when	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  economic	  
interests	  of	  the	  local	  government49.	  The	  GDP-­‐measurement	  takes	  a	  very	  high	  proportion	  in	  
the	  evaluation	  of	  intergovernments.	  High-­‐speed	  GDP-­‐growth	  not	  only	  is	  an	  important	  index	  
to	  measure	  local	  official´s	  performances	  linked	  with	  their	  future	  job	  promotions,	  but	  also	  
increases	  local	  fiscal	  revenues	  and	  benefits	  local	  officialdom	  materially	  as	  a	  whole50.	  
According	  to	  Interview	  4	  there	  is	  a	  clash	  between	  GDP-­‐growth	  and	  ecological	  activities	  in	  
China.	  Since	  the	  intergovernments	  have	  been	  regarding	  the	  economic	  growth	  as	  their	  top-­‐
priority,	  they	  need	  many	  productive	  activities	  to	  increase	  peoples	  short-­‐term	  living	  standard	  
in	  order	  to	  legitimize	  its	  own	  governance.	  These	  productive	  activities	  are	  very	  highly	  related	  
to	  water-­‐consumption,	  which	  imposes	  huge	  environmental	  pressures	  upon	  ecological	  
systems.	  
This	  dilemma	  can	  be	  highlighted	  between	  Beijing	  City	  and	  its	  upstream	  water-­‐supplier	  
Zhangjiakou	  City	  in	  Hebei	  province.	  In	  order	  to	  save	  water	  to	  the	  Chinese	  capital	  several	  
measures	  have	  been	  taken	  which	  has	  restricted	  the	  economical	  development	  of	  
Zhangjiakou51.	  As	  stated	  by	  Interview	  4:	  
“If	  Beijing	  helps	  Zhangjiakou	  to	  develop	  there	  will	  be	  much	  more	  economic	  development,	  but	  
the	  water	  will	  be	  even	  more	  polluted	  which	  will	  threatening	  Beijings	  water-­‐safety.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  if	  Beijing	  does	  not	  help	  them	  they	  will	  always	  be	  under-­‐developed	  which	  could	  
trigger	  disgruntled	  rural	  people	  to	  move	  to	  urban	  areas	  and	  increase	  the	  per	  capita	  water	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Wang, Xuejun & Ongley, Edwin., (2004), ”Transboundary Water Pollution Management in China: The Legal 
and Institutional Framework”, Water International, Volume 29, p. 272 
48 Lieberthal, Kenneth., (2004), ”Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform”, W*W*Norton & 
Company: New York, London – Second Edition, p.288 
49 Wang, Xuejun & Ongley, Edwin., (2004), ”Transboundary Water Pollution Management in China: The Legal 
and Institutional Framework”, Water International, Volume 29, p. 273 
50 Gang, Chen., (2009), ”Politics of Chinas Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress”, World 
Scientific Publishing CO: Singapore, p.23 
51 Interview 4; 15/04/2010 
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consumption.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  way	  we	  can	  realize	  this	  –	  and	  that	  is	  if	  we	  can	  find	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  ecological	  environment	  and	  internalize	  this	  into	  our	  welfare	  calculations.	  This	  
would	  encourage	  and	  give	  incentives	  for	  the	  governments,	  villages	  and	  farmers	  to	  fight	  for	  a	  
better	  environment”	  
A	  further	  problem	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  polluting	  enterprises	  can	  avoid	  compliance	  of	  strict	  
environmental	  standards	  by	  keeping	  good	  relations	  (guanxi)	  through	  bribery	  in	  forms	  of	  
cash52.	  Corruption	  is	  in	  this	  regard	  understandable	  because	  at	  this	  level	  the	  industry	  is	  




5.3	  River	  Basin	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  
	  
As	  subordinate	  institutions	  of	  MWR,	  China	  has	  long	  had	  seven	  river-­‐valley	  commissions	  to	  
work	  on	  the	  integrated	  development	  of	  entire	  river	  basins.	  Such	  commissions	  exist	  for	  the	  
Hai	  river	  basin	  and	  this	  institution	  are	  authorized	  by	  MWR	  to	  manage	  water	  resources	  in	  the	  
river	  basin.	  Theoretically	  speaking,	  the	  HRBC	  is	  an	  integrated	  institution,	  but	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  practice	  this	  commission	  has	  limited	  power	  because	  it	  doesn	  ́t	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  issue	  
orders	  to	  the	  provinces	  that	  fall	  within	  their	  jurisdiction53.	  Since	  each	  province	  has	  the	  same	  
rank	  as	  MWR,	  moreover,	  the	  commission	  lack	  any	  direct	  route	  for	  exercising	  executive	  
authority	  in	  the	  river	  basin.	  Furthermore,	  the	  river	  basin	  commissions,	  which	  have	  no	  formal	  
links	  to	  the	  EPBs	  have	  no	  responsibility	  for	  pollution	  planning	  or	  management	  and	  are	  
unable	  to	  implement	  comprehensive	  integrated	  water	  resource	  planning	  and	  
management54.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  for	  each	  RBC,	  the	  commissioner	  is	  appointed	  by	  the	  
ministry:	  there	  is	  no	  commission	  board	  or	  board	  of	  directors,	  and	  the	  provincial	  
governments	  have	  no	  role	  in	  their	  governance55.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  management	  
strategies	  is	  mainly	  top-­‐down	  centric	  with	  no	  inclusion	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  weak	  local	  
engagement.	  As	  stated	  by	  Interview	  2:	  
“At	  the	  moment	  the	  Hai	  River	  Basin	  Commission	  is	  a	  weak	  institution,	  it	  is	  just	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  MWR	  and	  it	  represent	  the	  opinion	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  It	  
doesn’t	  consist	  of	  experts	  or	  stakeholders	  from	  various	  districts.	  There	  are	  no	  experts	  or	  
officials	  from	  the	  governments	  in	  Beijing	  or	  Hebei	  province	  representing	  the	  commission.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Gang, Chen., (2009), ”Politics of Chinas Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress”, World 
Scientific Publishing CO: Singapore, p.18 
53 Interview 2; 08/04/2010 
54 Wang, Xuejun & Ongley, Edwin., (2004), ”Transboundary Water Pollution Management in China: The Legal 
and Institutional Framework”, Water International, Volume 29, p. 273 
55 Shen, Dajun., (2009), ”River basin water resources management in China: a legal and institutional 
assessment”, Water International, volume 34, No.4, p.492 
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Figure	  2.0	  Chinas	  Water	  Management	  Apparatus	  	  
Source:	  Adopted	  from	  Chen	  Gang	  2009:20	  
	  
	   26	  
6	  The	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  Case	  
It	  is	  now	  time	  to	  consider	  the	  cooperation	  situation	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  
over	  the	  scarce	  water	  resources	  along	  the	  Hai	  River.	  The	  data	  presented	  down	  below	  
derives	  from	  a	  8-­‐week	  field	  trip	  to	  Beijing	  and	  the	  cities	  of	  Zhangjiakou,	  Shijiazhuang	  in	  
Hebei	  province.	  I	  will	  start	  with	  a	  historical	  description	  of	  how	  the	  water	  crisis	  developed	  in	  
the	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  district	  in	  order	  to	  give	  the	  necessary	  background	  information	  to	  the	  
reader.	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  present	  water	  conflicts	  in	  the	  district	  and	  especially	  highlight	  
the	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  
	  
	  
6.1	  General	  Overview	  
	  
Beijing	  Municipality	  is	  located	  in	  the	  dry	  northeast	  edge	  of	  the	  Northern	  China	  in	  central	  
Hebei	  province.	  Since	  1958,	  the	  Chinese	  capital	  and	  its	  rural	  land	  were	  expanded	  to	  cover	  a	  
total	  area	  of	  16,400	  km2.56	  While	  Beijing	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  Chinas	  national	  political	  
and	  economic	  development,	  its	  expansion	  since	  1958	  has	  come	  at	  a	  serious	  ecological	  cost	  
for	  Hai	  river	  basin.	  About	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  surface	  water	  flowing	  through	  Beijing	  comes	  
from	  rivers	  and	  streams	  outside	  the	  municipality	  in	  neighbouring	  regions	  –	  Hebei	  province,	  
Shanxi	  province,	  and	  Inner	  Mongolia57.	  All	  are	  part	  of	  the	  much	  larger	  Hai	  river	  basin	  which	  
ranks	  as	  the	  most	  water	  shortage	  river	  system	  in	  China.	  Within	  Beijing	  municipality,	  the	  
average	  annual	  renewable	  freshwater	  supply	  available	  per	  person	  is	  less	  than	  300	  m3.58	  
Beijings	  surface	  water	  supply	  comes	  mainly	  from	  two	  sources:	  Yongding	  river	  and	  Chaobai	  
river.	  Both	  rivers	  are	  located	  in	  the	  upstream	  of	  Hebei	  province	  and	  are	  managed	  by	  the	  
city-­‐authorities	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde.	  This	  strategic-­‐geographical	  position	  makes	  Beijing	  
and	  its	  upstream	  districts	  closely	  interconnected59.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  drought	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  
freshwater	  supply	  due	  to	  withdrawals	  in	  upstream	  areas,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  
competition	  over	  water	  use	  and	  distribution	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  have	  become	  more	  
serious.	  However,	  in	  recent	  years,	  this	  intergovernmental	  situation	  has	  more	  and	  more	  been	  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Interview 7; 23/04/2010	  
57 Qing, Dan., (2008), ”Beijings Water Crisis: 1949-2008 Olympics”, Probe International, p.3, available online 
at www.probeinternational.org. 
58 Interview 2; 08/04/2010 
59 Interview 7; 23/04/2010 
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6.2	  The	  Decline	  of	  Guanting	  and	  Rise	  of	  Miyun	  Reservoir	  
“China´s	  policy	  makers	  have	  no	  choice:	  we	  must	  switch	  from	  supply-­‐side	  management	  to	  
demand-­‐side	  management”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  Interview	  8	  
	  
Today,	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Beijings	  total	  water-­‐supply	  comes	  from	  groundwater.	  The	  rest	  is	  
surface	  water	  coming	  from	  85	  reservoirs	  and	  rivers.	  The	  municipality’s	  two	  largest	  
reservoirs,	  Guanting	  and	  Miyun,	  are	  under	  jurisdiction	  of	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde	  city	  in	  
Hebei	  province.	  About	  97	  %	  of	  the	  Guanting	  reservoir	  and	  its	  huge	  catchment	  area	  of	  
43,402	  km2	  are	  located	  in	  the	  neighbouring	  provinces60.	  According	  to	  the	  initial	  design	  
Guanting	  reservoir	  had	  a	  planned	  storage	  capacity	  of	  4,16	  billion	  m3,	  but	  in	  recent	  years	  the	  
storage	  has	  been	  reduced	  to	  less	  than	  1,3	  billion	  m3.61	  When	  the	  reservoir	  was	  constructed	  
in	  1954,	  planners	  obviously	  did	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  economic	  development	  and	  
rising	  water	  demand	  for	  agricultural	  irrigation	  and	  industries	  in	  Beijings	  neighboring	  
provinces	  Hebei	  and	  Tianjin.	  	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  construction	  of	  248	  small	  reservoirs	  as	  well	  
as	  intensive	  groundwater	  mining	  caused	  a	  considerable	  reduction	  of	  Guanting´s	  inflow.	  
Severe	  pollution	  by	  untreated	  sewage	  from	  the	  cities	  of	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Datong	  decreased	  
the	  water	  inflow	  to	  Beijing62.	  In	  1997,	  the	  Guanting	  reservoir	  had	  become	  too	  polluted	  to	  
use	  as	  a	  source	  of	  drinking	  water,	  which	  led	  Beijing	  to	  close	  it	  down	  from	  providing	  water	  to	  
Beijings	  urban	  supply.	  The	  Water	  Resource	  Bureau	  of	  Beijing	  Municipality	  initiated	  several	  
projects	  to	  improve	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  the	  polluted	  reservoir,	  such	  as	  building	  wastewater-­‐
treatment	  plants	  and	  closing	  down	  polluting	  factories	  in	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde.	  
According	  to	  Beijing	  officials	  these	  measures	  have	  taken	  great	  effect	  and	  the	  inflow	  to	  
Beijing	  can	  now	  be	  used	  for	  urban	  supply	  again.	  
	  
With	  deteriorating	  water	  quality	  of	  Guanting	  reservoir	  and	  the	  depletion	  of	  groundwater	  
tables	  in	  urban	  areas,	  Miyun	  reservoir	  became	  increasingly	  important	  for	  Beijing	  in	  the	  
1980s63.	  With	  a	  total	  watershed	  area	  of	  15,	  788	  km2,	  2/3	  of	  the	  areas	  in	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  
Chengde,	  and	  a	  capacity	  of	  4,38	  billion	  m3	  -­‐	  it	  was	  mainly	  responsible	  for	  providing	  water	  to	  
rural	  areas	  in	  Beijing,	  Hebei	  and	  Tianjin64.	  In	  1981,	  there	  was	  a	  prolonged	  severe	  drought	  
and	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  that	  the	  two	  big	  reservoirs	  were	  no	  longer	  going	  to	  supply	  the	  
downstream	  regions	  but	  only	  Beijing.	  At	  that	  time	  a	  conflict	  emerged	  between	  Beijing	  and	  
Tianjin.	  In	  situations	  like	  this,	  even	  though	  the	  political	  structure	  doesnt	  allow	  any	  province	  
to	  impose	  its	  will	  on	  any	  other	  province,	  Beijing,	  as	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  country,	  have	  
administrative	  help	  from	  the	  central	  government65.	  Consequently,	  this	  conflict	  induced	  the	  
State	  Council	  to	  assure	  Beijing	  rights	  to	  the	  reservoirs,	  and	  as	  an	  exchange	  a	  water-­‐diversion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., 
61 Interview 4; 15/04/2010 
62 Peisert, Christoph & Sternfeld, Eva., (2005), ”Quenching Beijing´s Thirst: The Need for Integrated 
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project	  from	  the	  Luan	  River	  was	  built	  to	  Tianjin.	  From	  that	  time	  and	  on,	  water	  from	  Miyun	  
was	  only	  reserved	  for	  domestic	  use	  for	  Beijing	  and	  would	  neither	  be	  used	  to	  supply	  industry	  
or	  agriculture66.	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  capacity	  of	  Miyun	  reservoir	  has	  declined	  sharply.	  
According	  to	  Interview	  4	  can	  the	  reservoir	  at	  the	  moment	  just	  hold	  as	  much	  water	  as	  960	  
million	  m3,	  which	  is	  less	  than	  ¼	  of	  the	  original	  capacity67.	  
	  
I	  have	  stated	  here	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  how	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijings	  water	  crisis	  arose,	  
which	  entirely	  has	  been	  handled	  in	  a	  technical	  way;	  find	  or	  make	  more	  water	  supplies.	  The	  
strong	  water-­‐supply	  management	  strategy	  from	  China´s	  policy	  makers	  can	  also	  be	  
exemplified	  in	  the	  40	  billion	  dollar-­‐project:	  the	  South	  to	  North	  Water	  Diversion	  Project	  
(SNWD).	  The	  SNWD	  will	  transfer	  water	  northward	  from	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  system.	  
Construction	  of	  the	  “middle	  route”	  began	  in	  2003	  and	  is	  supposed	  to	  divert	  up	  to	  14	  billion	  
m3	  to	  the	  North	  in	  2010,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  delayed	  due	  to	  environmental	  and	  cost	  concerns	  
and	  will	  be	  completed	  in	  summer	  of	  2014.	  So	  the	  project	  will	  bring	  some	  short	  relief	  since	  
72	  counties	  of	  Hebei	  province,	  80	  %	  of	  the	  area,	  and	  90	  %	  of	  the	  area	  of	  Beijing	  will	  be	  able	  
to	  have	  sufficient	  water	  if	  the	  project	  is	  succeded.	  In	  the	  long	  term,	  however,	  northern	  
China	  must	  make	  drastic	  efficiency	  gains	  if	  it	  doesnt	  want	  to	  risk	  to	  dry	  up68.	  
	  
	  
6.3	  Water	  Conflicts	  
	  
Managing	  water	  resources	  over	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  have	  become	  a	  demanding	  task	  of	  
the	  Hebei	  provincial	  and	  Beijing	  government.	  The	  two	  main	  water	  conflicts	  stemming	  from	  
the	  rivalling	  authorities	  have	  been:	  
	  
1)	  Conflicts	  over	  distribution	  and	  quality:	  Since	  70-­‐80	  %	  of	  the	  surface	  water	  supply	  to	  
Beijing	  comes	  from	  Miyun	  and	  Guanting	  reservoir,	  which	  to	  a	  great	  part	  belongs	  to	  Hebei	  
province,	  the	  water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  these	  reservoirs	  depend	  on	  the	  water	  use	  in	  this	  
province69.	  To	  evaluate	  the	  responsibilities	  and	  benefits	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  beneficiaries	  is	  an	  
issue	  disputed	  between	  Hebei	  and	  Beijing.	  	  Authorities	  in	  Hebei	  maintain	  that	  those	  
benefiting	  from	  both	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  water	  should	  pay	  –	  and	  therefore	  Beijing	  
should	  pay	  them	  a	  compensation	  for	  delivering	  water	  to	  Beijing.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
Beijing´s	  position	  is	  that	  those	  polluting	  the	  water	  should	  pay70.	  Consequently,	  officials	  in	  
Beijing	  have	  argued	  about	  the	  heavily	  polluting	  factories	  in	  upstream	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  
Chengde.	  The	  behaviour	  of	  both	  intergovernments	  can	  be	  termed	  as	  a	  “free-­‐rider	  problem”.	  
That	  is,	  although	  both	  parties	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  in	  the	  Hai	  
river	  basin,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  specific	  interest	  of	  each	  intergovernment	  for	  both	  intergovernments	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to	  sacrifice	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  that	  collective	  interest.	  In	  this	  context,	  each	  intergovernment	  
will	  stick	  to	  their	  “principle”	  and	  basically	  “free-­‐ride”	  on	  the	  water	  quality	  cleanup	  of	  the	  
other.	  Why	  should	  Hebei	  clean	  up	  its	  polluting	  actions	  when	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  receive	  
compensation	  from	  Beijing	  that	  benefit	  downstream?	  Why	  should	  Beijing	  give	  
compensation	  to	  Hebei	  when	  water	  resources	  are	  heavily	  polluted	  from	  upstream	  Hebei?	  
	  
2)	  Beijing	  restricting	  Hebeis	  upstream	  districts	  development:	  Heavily	  industrialized	  areas	  in	  
upstream	  Chengde	  and	  Zhangjiakou	  of	  Hebei	  have	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  Beijings	  
headaches	  in	  the	  past.	  That	  this	  has	  been	  the	  case	  is	  not	  surprising	  –	  with	  3656	  and	  3286	  
(RMB)	  as	  an	  annual	  net	  income	  per	  capita	  for	  rural	  people	  in	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde,	  
these	  areas	  demonstrates	  a	  huge	  contrast	  to	  wealthy	  Beijing	  whose	  annual	  net	  income	  per	  
capita	  was	  10747	  (RMB)	  for	  rural	  people	  in	  200871.	  	  This	  pollution-­‐burden	  on	  Beijing	  led	  to	  
the	  establishment	  of	  water	  protection	  zones	  under	  the	  1985	  and	  1995	  regulations,	  which	  
strongly	  restricted	  the	  economical	  boom	  in	  upstream	  districts	  of	  Hebei.	  	  As	  Beijings	  
development	  has	  gradually	  increased	  since	  then,	  so	  has	  Beijings	  desire	  to	  get	  water	  from	  
Hebei	  increased.	  While	  the	  upstream	  areas	  of	  Hebei	  need	  rapid	  development	  to	  reduce	  the	  
economic	  gaps,	  and	  as	  result,	  water	  use	  and	  sewage	  discharges	  has	  increased.	  In	  this	  
condition,	  there	  is	  a	  clash	  between	  GDP-­‐growth	  and	  ecological	  activities	  which	  is	  at	  the	  
center	  of	  urban-­‐rural	  conflicts	  in	  China	  and	  highlights	  an	  issue	  that	  the	  Central	  government	  
so	  far	  has	  not	  a	  complete	  solution	  to72.	  
	  
	  
6.4	  From	  Conflicts	  to	  Sharing	  of	  Benefits	  
	  
In	  the	  beginning	  of	  21	  century,	  the	  Central	  government	  began	  to	  feel	  the	  urgent	  need	  to	  
address	  the	  ecological	  issues	  caused	  by	  the	  regions	  rapid	  economical	  growth.	  That	  the	  
water	  crisis	  in	  the	  early	  2000:s	  is	  an	  issue	  on	  the	  rise	  is	  obvious.	  In	  lesser	  than	  60	  years	  
Beijing	  has	  been	  transformed	  from	  relative	  water	  abundance	  to	  water	  crisis.	  The	  political	  
reaction	  to	  its	  water	  crisis	  was	  set	  by	  this	  internal	  crisis	  together	  with	  an	  external	  factor,	  
namely	  the	  Olympics	  bid	  victory	  in	  2001.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  the	  present	  water	  crisis	  and	  conflicts,	  
the	  success	  of	  the	  Olympics	  beating	  functioned	  as	  a	  catalyst	  which	  gave	  the	  State	  Council	  
the	  power	  to	  implement	  the	  “Plan	  for	  Sustainable	  Water	  Utilization	  in	  Early	  21st	  Century	  
(2001-­‐2005)73.	  This	  plan	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  better	  coordination	  and	  fewer	  conflicts	  in	  the	  
region	  by	  promoting	  projects	  of	  water	  conservation	  and	  pollution	  control	  in	  the	  upstream	  
water	  source	  areas	  like	  Hebei	  and	  Beijing.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  purposes	  of	  the	  plan	  was	  to	  
make	  sure	  the	  sustainable	  usage	  of	  the	  water	  resources	  among	  these	  districts,	  as	  well	  as	  
economic	  development	  in	  both	  districts74.	  The	  State	  Council´s	  plan	  required	  that	  payments	  
in	  water	  resource	  projects	  within	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  mainly	  be	  financed	  by	  the	  
intergovernment´s	  budgets,	  with	  adequate	  support	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  The	  
central	  government	  subsidized	  875	  million	  dollars,	  while	  the	  Beijing	  municipality	  invested	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1.875	  billion	  dollars	  in	  the	  projects	  of	  environmental	  construction	  and	  pollution	  control	  in	  
the	  upstream	  of	  Miyun	  and	  Guanting	  reservoirs.	  For	  Miyun	  and	  Guanting	  reservoirs	  in	  the	  
planning,	  Hebei	  province	  invested	  498	  million	  dollars	  through	  164	  sub-­‐projects	  including	  
agricultural	  and	  industrial	  water	  saving,	  water	  and	  soil	  conservation,	  pollution	  control,	  
capacity	  building,	  etc.	  To	  enhance	  the	  real-­‐time	  monitoring	  of	  water	  quantity	  and	  water	  
quality	  in	  the	  cross-­‐province	  boundaries	  and	  strengthen	  capability	  building	  of	  planning	  
implementation,	  the	  Hai	  River	  Basin	  Commission	  was	  authorized	  to	  set	  up	  a	  system	  for	  
water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  monitoring.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  projects	  were,	  however,	  
weak	  and	  no	  long-­‐term	  effective	  payment	  mechanism	  was	  established	  that	  could	  keep	  the	  
cooperation	  endurable75.	  	  
In	  the	  beginning	  of	  2005	  “suggestions	  for	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  policies”	  was	  made	  by	  MWR	  
who	  defined	  water	  right	  transfer	  as	  the	  transfer	  of	  access	  rights	  to	  water	  resources76.	  The	  
distribution	  of	  water-­‐user	  rights	  and	  the	  initiative	  of	  new	  fairer	  economic	  mechanisms,	  such	  
as	  water	  price	  bargaining	  –	  promoted	  watershed	  environment	  improvement	  in	  the	  Hebei-­‐
Beijing	  region77.	  Although	  the	  policies	  from	  2001	  indicate	  that	  financing	  sustainability	  is	  a	  
concern,	  the	  plan	  from	  2001	  together	  with	  the	  Water	  Law	  2002,	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  and	  
initiatives	  such	  as	  water-­‐price	  bargaining	  have	  all	  been	  significant	  policy-­‐steps	  in	  
establishing	  a	  framework	  of	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  As	  stated	  by	  Interview	  2:	  
“These	  policies	  have	  slowly	  transformed	  the	  traditional	  administrational	  mechanisms	  to	  
more	  fair	  and	  market	  dependent	  mechanisms.	  As	  here	  we	  can	  see	  bargaining,	  the	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6.5	  Eco-­‐Compensation	  in	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  
“Ultimately,	  if	  the	  cooperation	  should	  subsequently	  hold	  in	  the	  future	  there	  must	  be	  “win-­‐
win”	  outcome	  for	  both	  parties”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  Interview	  7	  
	  
Following	  the	  creation	  of	  institutionalized	  approaches	  in	  2001-­‐2005,	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  
these	  policies	  took	  place	  when	  politicians	  were	  increasing	  their	  focus	  on	  eco-­‐compensation	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  country´s	  development	  plans.	  In	  April	  2006,	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  stressed	  
in	  his	  speech	  at	  China´s	  6th	  National	  Conference	  on	  Environmental	  Protection	  that	  “‘the	  
policy	  and	  mechanism	  for	  eco-­‐compensation	  will	  be	  established	  and	  improved	  in	  accordance	  
with	  the	  principle	  of	  who	  exploits	  conserves,	  who	  damages	  pays,	  who	  benefits	  compensates	  
and	  who	  pollutes	  pays”.	  The	  State	  Council´s	  Decision	  on	  Strengthening	  Envirionmental	  
Protection	  for	  Scientific	  Development	  issued	  in	  December	  2005	  -­‐	  also	  mirrors	  the	  
commitment	  to	  come	  up	  with	  innovative	  mechanisms	  to	  address	  environmental	  and	  
ecological	  imbalances	  of	  all	  stakeholders	  involved.	  It	  required	  that	  “‘eco-­‐	  compensation	  
mechanisms	  should	  be	  established	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  and	  the	  central	  and	  local	  
government	  budgets	  should	  include	  eco-­‐compensation	  elements,	  and	  pilot	  work	  in	  eco-­‐
compensation	  must	  be	  under-­‐	  taken	  at	  national	  and	  local	  level”.	  In	  Chinas	  eleventh	  five-­‐year	  
plan	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  (2006-­‐2010)	  also	  required	  eco-­‐compensation	  
should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  transfer	  and	  payment	  of	  central	  and	  local	  finance78.	  	  
This	  policy-­‐change	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  Water	  Resource	  and	  Environment	  Coordination	  
Committee	  with	  Zhangjiakou,	  Chengde	  and	  Beijing	  in	  2005	  -­‐	  which	  formulated	  Management	  
Practices	  of	  the	  Treatment	  Funds	  for	  the	  Water	  Resource	  and	  Environment	  in	  Beijing	  and	  its	  
neighboring	  area.	  The	  compensation	  was	  mainly	  provided	  by	  the	  Central	  government	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  transferred	  payment	  while	  complemented	  by	  some	  funds	  from	  Beijing	  Municipality.	  
It	  covered	  two	  areas.	  	  One	  was	  mainly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  transferred	  payment	  to	  control	  water	  
environment	  pollution	  in	  Guanting	  and	  Miyun	  Reservoir,	  while	  the	  other	  payment	  was	  to	  
develop	  water-­‐saving	  industries	  in	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde.	  From	  2005	  to	  2009,	  Beijing	  
spent	  100	  million	  RMB	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  costs	  and	  losses	  in	  the	  protection	  in	  the	  
headwaters	  of	  Guanting	  and	  Miyun	  reservoirs79.	  Furthermore,	  with	  the	  relevant	  policies	  
designed	  by	  the	  central	  government	  -­‐	  a	  policy	  platform	  was	  now	  set	  up	  to	  make	  eco-­‐
compensation	  possible	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  Such	  a	  mechanism	  had	  been	  proposed	  for	  a	  
long	  time	  by	  both	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde	  who	  wished	  to	  establish	  a	  “mechanism	  of	  
payment	  for	  water	  utilization	  based	  on	  water	  value”	  by	  means	  of	  “linking	  water	  to	  
benefits”.	  A	  significant	  breakthrough	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  was	  made	  in	  October	  2006	  when	  
the	  Beijing	  government	  paid	  money	  to	  compensate	  Hebei	  for	  water	  obtained	  from	  the	  
province.	  
In	  2006	  and	  2008,	  the	  governments	  of	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  signed	  the	  Memorandum	  on	  
Consolidation	  of	  Cooperation	  in	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Development,	  listing	  the	  cooperation	  
programs	  in	  nine	  aspects,	  including	  construction	  of	  transportation	  infrastructure,	  protection	  
of	  water	  resources	  and	  ecological	  environment80.	  Following	  this	  cooperation,	  Beijing	  signed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Guihuan Liu & Jun Wan., (2008), ” Eco-Compensation Policies and Mechanisms in China”, BlackWell 
Publishing Ltd, Volym 17 p.235. 
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80 Ibid., 
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an	  agreement	  with	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Chengde	  in	  which	  compensation	  was	  being	  provided	  to	  
those	  farmers	  who	  gave	  up	  water-­‐use-­‐intensive	  farming.	  With	  this,	  Beijing	  would	  gain	  
around	  50	  million	  more	  square	  metres	  of	  water	  and	  local	  farmers	  in	  Hebei	  would	  be	  
compensated	  50	  million	  RMB	  annually	  within	  the	  first	  two-­‐year	  period	  of	  the	  agreement81.	  	  
Since	  2006,	  the	  transition	  from	  rice-­‐growing	  to	  dry	  land	  farming	  has	  been	  launched	  in	  
Chaobai	  river	  drainage	  area	  and	  Chicheng	  county	  of	  Zhangjiakou	  city	  who	  have	  transformed	  
17.4	  thousand	  mu	  (1	  mu=666.7	  m2).	  From	  2007	  to	  2008,	  a	  total	  area	  of	  103	  thousand	  mu	  
has	  been	  transformed	  in	  Chicheng	  county	  of	  Zhangjiakou,	  Fengning	  and	  Luangping	  county	  in	  
Chengde	  city.	  Any	  kind	  of	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticides	  were	  forbidden	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  
pollution,	  and	  as	  a	  payment	  for	  this	  burden	  Beijing	  compensated	  the	  local	  farmers	  with	  400	  
RMB/mu	  in	  2006,	  450	  in	  2007	  to	  550	  in	  200882.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Crop-­‐pattern	  Change	  
Program,	  the	  government	  of	  Zhangjiakou	  proposed	  a	  ”Transboundary	  Water	  Environmental	  
Protection	  and	  Information	  Sharing	  System	  Construction	  Program”	  in	  2006.	  The	  program	  
started	  in	  October	  2007	  and	  investment	  added	  up	  to	  23	  million	  RMB	  where	  Beijing	  would	  
afford	  12	  million.	  Emphasis	  was	  put	  on	  capacity	  building	  to	  share	  water	  environment	  
information	  between	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Beijing	  and	  to	  cope	  with	  emergencies	  in	  the	  
transboundary	  area	  by	  constructing	  a	  monitoring	  system.	  These	  policies,	  which	  attempts	  to	  
increase	  the	  knowledge-­‐generating	  capacities,	  have	  all	  in	  all	  created	  cooperative	  knowledge	  
between	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Beijing83.  
Although	  the	  water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  Zhangjiakou	  has	  been	  improved	  significantly	  
since	  the	  Crop-­‐pattern	  project	  was	  implemented84,	  the	  payment	  for	  environmental	  services	  
upstream	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  transparent	  and	  doesn’t	  include	  mechanisms	  that	  directly	  
reward	  upstream	  farmers.	  According	  to	  some	  farmers	  in	  Houcheng	  town	  of	  Chicheng	  county	  
the	  project	  is	  compulsory	  and	  only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  the	  compensation	  was	  transferred	  to	  
the	  farmers	  for	  their	  water	  protection	  activities.	  Moreover,	  the	  criteria	  is	  too	  rigid	  which	  
disencourage	  farmers	  who	  are	  growing	  less-­‐water-­‐intensified	  crops	  all	  the	  time.	  For	  
example,	  farmers	  who	  grew	  corn	  before	  the	  project	  started	  will	  be	  excluded	  from	  full	  
compensation	  since	  they	  will	  not	  have	  to	  change	  their	  crop-­‐pattern	  from	  rice	  to	  corn.85	  
Another	  problem	  is	  that	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  the	  compensation	  is	  mainly	  in	  form	  of	  projects.	  
According	  to	  sources	  from	  Beijing	  offcials,	  Hebei	  and	  Shanxi	  provinces	  organized	  a	  large	  
scale	  water	  diversion	  to	  Beijing	  in	  last	  October	  2009.	  The	  transfer	  of	  44	  million	  cubic	  meters	  
of	  water	  was	  fulfilled	  under	  the	  coordination	  of	  MWR	  while	  the	  Beijing	  municipal	  
government	  provided	  the	  compensation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  funds	  and	  projects,	  rather	  than	  
water	  resource	  compensation86.	  This	  highlights	  that	  a	  formal	  payment	  from	  Beijing	  to	  Hebei	  
based	  on	  present	  water	  issues	  exists	  but	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  developed	  into	  a	  criteria	  of	  
payment	  that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  relevant	  stakeholders	  or	  been	  sufficiently	  institutionalized.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Guihuan Liu & Jun Wan., (2008), ” Eco-Compensation Policies and Mechanisms in China”, BlackWell 
Publishing Ltd, Volym 17 p.239. 
82 Interview 11; 12/05/2010 
83 Interview 9; 10/05/2010 
84 Ibid., 
85 Interview 10; 11/05/2010 
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On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  mechanism	  of	  eco-­‐compensation	  established	  
between	  provinces	  in	  China	  in	  which	  monetary	  compensation	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  lower	  
reaches	  to	  the	  upper	  reaches	  for	  the	  measures	  taken	  to	  save	  water87.	  
From	  the	  above,	  some	  lessons	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  from	  the	  current	  eco-­‐compensation	  
mechanisms	  between	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  province.	  Despite	  successful	  steps	  at	  the	  provincial	  
level,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  both	  ecological	  compensation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  transferred	  payment	  
from	  the	  Central	  government	  in	  2005-­‐2009	  and	  the	  compensation	  mechanism	  designed	  by	  
Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  in	  2006/2008	  –	  faces	  challenges.	  These	  are	  as	  follows:	  
1) The	  implementation	  of	  eco-­‐compensations	  mechanisms	  need	  to	  be	  further	  
strengthened.	  First	  of	  all,	  a	  lack	  of	  legislative	  support	  in	  this	  regard	  presents	  
difficulties	  for	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  to	  implement	  eco-­‐compensation.	  Some	  laws	  and	  
regulations	  have	  general	  rather	  than	  clear	  and	  concrete	  stipulations	  for	  ecological	  
compensation.	  For	  example,	  Water	  Pollution	  Prevention	  Law	  defines	  that	  “The	  
Government	  shall	  set	  up	  ecological	  compensation	  mechanism	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
transferred	  payment	  for	  the	  sourcing	  area	  of	  drinking	  water	  and	  the	  upstream	  area	  
along	  the	  rivers,	  lakes	  and	  reservoirs.”	  So	  far,	  there	  are	  no	  detailed	  regulations	  for	  
the	  implementation	  of	  this	  stipulation	  that	  intergovernments	  can	  refer	  to.	  
2) Financing	  sustainability	  is	  a	  concern	  since	  no	  long-­‐term	  mechanism	  is	  guaranteed.	  
The	  ecological	  construction	  project	  invested	  by	  the	  Central	  government	  does	  not	  
have	  the	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  or	  the	  coordination	  mechanisms	  between	  various	  
departments.	  The	  ecological	  compensation	  for	  the	  upstream	  areas	  of	  Guanting	  and	  
Miyun	  reservoirs	  are	  mainly	  undertaken	  by	  forestry,	  water	  resources	  and	  
environmental	  protection	  agencies,	  without	  a	  coordinated	  mechanism	  that	  can	  
integrate	  the	  stakeholders	  involved.	  
3) Lack	  of	  clarity	  of	  who	  benefits	  and	  who	  should	  pay	  for	  the	  ecosystem	  services.	  
Since	  there	  is	  no	  long-­‐term	  compensation	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  ecological	  
cooperation	  between	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  province,	  which	  clearly	  defines	  the	  scope	  of	  
benefits	  and	  responsibilities,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  track	  down	  the	  responsible	  party	  once	  the	  
compensation	  program	  for	  water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  fails.	  This	  pattern	  of	  
diversified	  compensation	  from	  Central	  government	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  to	  Hebei	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7.	  Analysis	  
This	  chapter	  deals	  with	  my	  research	  question	  which	  will	  be	  answered	  through	  an	  analysis	  
linking	  the	  theory	  with	  the	  case	  study.	  I	  will	  analyse	  the	  case	  with	  my	  analytical	  framework	  
and	  by	  doing	  so	  also	  answer	  the	  research	  question:	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  that	  self-­‐interested	  
intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  collaborating	  on	  scarce	  
water	  resources?	  
	  
1.	  Reciprocal	  Interdependence	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3.2,	  reciprocal	  interdependence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  analytical	  
framework	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  interesting	  question	  then	  becomes:	  Are	  both	  intergovernments	  
in	  a	  situation	  where	  they	  can	  attain	  mutually	  payoffs	  from	  cooperation?	  
Both	  the	  Memorandum	  on	  Consolidation	  of	  Cooperation	  in	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Development	  in	  2006	  and	  2008	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  are	  procedures	  for	  cooperating	  to	  
realize	  the	  optimal	  use	  of	  scarce	  water	  resources	  in	  the	  same	  region.	  To	  some	  extent,	  these	  
agreements	  confirms	  interdependence.	  The	  upper	  reaches	  of	  Hebei	  are	  of	  strategic	  
importance	  to	  Beijing	  due	  to	  its	  position	  for	  ecosystem	  health	  downstream.	  Beijings	  
economic	  power	  is	  also	  important	  to	  Hebei	  to	  strengthen	  its	  economy.	  That	  is,	  because	  the	  
payoffs	  for	  overexploitation	  has	  become	  highly	  negative	  in	  the	  upstream/downstream	  
relationship,	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  of	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  has	  become	  cooperation.	  This	  
observation	  implies	  that	  the	  interdependence	  of	  the	  intergovernments	  have	  induced	  them	  
to	  exchange	  data	  and	  coordinate	  their	  policies	  by	  signing	  agreements	  in	  2006	  and	  2008.	  
Furthermore,	  convergence	  towards	  a	  cooperative	  agenda	  has	  resulted	  in	  benefits-­‐sharing	  to	  
both	  parties.	  The	  first	  type	  of	  benefit	  derived	  from	  the	  cooperation	  is	  better	  water-­‐
management,	  providing	  benefits	  to	  upstream	  Hebei	  and	  downstream	  Beijing	  in	  terms	  of	  
water	  quality	  and	  quantity89.	  Even	  if	  both	  sides	  arrive	  at	  seeing	  the	  benefits	  from	  water	  
management,	  the	  outcomes	  are	  not	  equitable.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Beijing	  Municipality	  has	  
provided	  particular	  compensations	  to	  the	  upstream	  Hebei	  districts	  who	  make	  ecological	  
services	  to	  Beijing.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Hebei	  has	  mainly	  received	  compensation	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  projects	  and	  not	  through	  an	  arrangement	  where	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  are	  articulated	  in	  
a	  legal	  way	  that	  is	  evenly	  distributed	  to	  the	  stakeholders	  involved.	  For	  example,	  the	  Crop-­‐
pattern	  Change	  Program	  was	  mandatory	  and	  meant	  no	  adequate	  payments	  to	  farmers	  who	  
switched	  their	  crop-­‐pattern	  from	  rice	  to	  corn.	  This	  skewed	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  
means	  asymmetrical	  interdependence	  which	  gives	  power	  leverage	  to	  the	  most	  dependent	  
party,	  the	  downstream	  Beijing	  Municipality.	  
Against	  this	  background,	  I	  would	  therefore	  hold	  that	  reciprocal	  interdependence	  can	  be	  
identified	  but	  in	  a	  purely	  asymmetrical	  fashion.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Confirmed by Interview 2; Interview 7; Interview 9. 
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2.	  Uncertainty	  Reduction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“This	  cooperation	  surely	  starts	  from	  mutual	  trust,	  without	  trust	  there	  would	  be	  no	  
cooperation”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  Interview	  7	  
	  
Is	  there	  more	  trust	  and	  less	  uncertainty	  now	  than	  earlier	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  
Beijing?	  As	  readers	  know	  from	  my	  theoretical	  chapter,	  uncertainty	  is	  often	  a	  barrier	  to	  
cooperation	  because	  intergovernments	  have	  incomplete	  information	  about	  each	  others	  
intentions	  and	  have	  to	  cope	  with	  uncertain	  water	  supplies.	  Moreover,	  uncertainty	  over	  
current	  and	  future	  benefits/costs	  has	  obviously	  been	  a	  barrier	  to	  prompt	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  to	  
choose	  a	  strategy	  of	  conditional	  cooperation.	  The	  mistrust	  in	  this	  political	  struggle	  over	  
water	  resources	  began,	  however,	  to	  slowly	  be	  transformed	  in	  the	  2000s.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  
is	  simple.	  Beijing	  and	  Hebeis	  changing	  preferences	  occurred	  within	  –	  simply	  put	  –	  a	  more	  
encouraging	  institutional	  framework.	  A	  few	  developments	  in	  that	  first	  decade	  stand	  out	  as	  
particularly	  important,	  such	  as	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Water	  Law	  in	  2002	  and	  the	  Water	  Rights	  
Transfer	  policies	  in	  2005,	  which	  was	  the	  turning	  point	  to	  distribute	  water-­‐user	  rights.	  These	  
policies	  in	  combination	  with	  water-­‐price	  bargaining	  initiatives	  changed	  ”the	  strategic	  
climate”	  for	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  and	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  them	  to	  create	  new	  cooperative	  
knowledge.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  step	  towards	  cooperation	  during	  that	  decade	  was	  
the	  ecological	  compensation	  policies	  which	  opened	  up	  the	  possibility	  to	  balance	  the	  
interests	  of	  various	  stakeholders.	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  these	  opportunities	  reduced	  the	  
uncertainty	  in	  ways	  that	  enhanced	  the	  prospects	  for	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  
intergovernments.	  In	  this	  context,	  Hebei	  and	  Beijing	  reduced	  the	  transaction	  costs	  involved	  
in	  bargaining	  over	  water	  by	  signing	  Memorandum	  on	  Consolidation	  of	  Cooperation	  in	  
Economic	  and	  Social	  Development	  in	  2006	  that	  included	  common	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
distribution	  of	  information	  concerning	  water	  quality	  and	  quantity.	  As	  interview	  9	  admit,	  the	  
“Transboundary	  Water	  Environmental	  Protection	  and	  Information	  Sharing	  System	  
Construction	  Program”	  has	  resulted	  in	  shared	  knowledge	  between	  Zhangjiakou	  and	  Beijing.	  
The	  fact	  that	  transparency	  has	  increased	  and	  transaction	  costs	  has	  decreased	  can	  further	  be	  
confirmed	  by	  following	  quote	  from	  a	  Hebei	  official:	  
”The	  projects	  from	  2006	  together	  with	  South	  to	  North	  Water	  Diversion	  Project	  has	  certainly	  
meant	  that	  we	  officials	  are	  working	  more	  closely	  and	  trust	  each	  other	  more	  than	  before”90	  
An	  interesting	  thing	  here	  is	  that	  that	  cooperation	  has	  spilled	  over	  to	  nine	  areas	  that	  are	  of	  
concern	  for	  both	  parties,	  such	  as	  traffic	  infrastructure	  and	  agriculture.	  This	  integration	  of	  
each	  governments	  economic	  and	  ecological	  ties	  shape	  their	  interest	  such	  that	  it	  coincide	  
with	  cooperation.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  I	  have	  asked	  above,	  I	  think	  my	  reasoning	  
harmonizes	  well	  with	  the	  view	  that	  ”uncertainty	  reduction”	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  
cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  The	  presence	  of	  this	  aspect	  can,	  however,	  be	  traced	  to	  
the	  institutional	  framework	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  this	  analysis.	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3.	  Lengthening	  the	  Time	  Horizons	  
“The	  cooperation	  should	  goes	  on	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  course	  since	  we	  all	  know	  that	  Guanting	  and	  
Miyun	  reservoirs	  are	  in	  a	  strategic	  geopolitical	  position	  to	  Beijing	  which	  makes	  alternatives	  
to	  cooperation	  impossible”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  Interview	  7	  	  
	  
An	  important	  dimension	  of	  collective-­‐action	  problems	  relating	  to	  water-­‐cooperation	  is	  time	  
horizon.	  For	  almost	  any	  policy	  maker	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  succeed	  in	  lengthening	  time	  horizons	  
since	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  justify	  policies	  that	  imposes	  costs	  on	  society	  today	  but	  yields	  benefits	  in	  
the	  future.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  my	  thesis,	  self-­‐interested	  actors	  can,	  however,	  overcome	  
this	  obstacle	  and	  choose	  the	  strategy	  of	  cooperation	  when	  they	  see	  themselves	  locked	  into	  
regular	  future	  interaction	  and	  value	  it	  more	  relative	  to	  the	  present.	  The	  questions	  is	  then	  
whether	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing´s	  change	  of	  path	  in	  the	  water	  sector	  can	  be	  explained	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  actors	  have	  acted	  in	  extended	  time	  horizons.	  Are	  Hebei	  province	  and	  
Beijing	  perceiving	  themselves	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  relationship	  that	  promises	  future	  benefits?	  
If	  we	  ignore	  the	  rhetorical	  part	  and	  instead	  look	  at	  the	  policy	  which	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  
cooperation-­‐agreements	  in	  2006	  and	  2008,	  then	  there	  is	  little	  support	  that	  long	  term	  costs	  
and	  benefits	  have	  had	  any	  crucial	  effect	  on	  the	  intergovernments	  changed	  path.	  I	  want	  to	  
refer	  to	  three	  reasons	  why	  the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  for	  collaboration	  on	  water	  
and	  other	  issues	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  not	  reflects	  extended	  time	  horizons.	  First,	  this	  is	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  transboundary	  eco-­‐compensation	  mechanism	  designed	  by	  
Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  province	  does	  not	  have	  the	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  since	  it	  was	  signed	  in	  
2006	  and	  2008,	  with	  negotiations	  for	  every	  year.	  Second,	  the	  eco-­‐compensation	  
arrangement	  has	  not	  reflected	  a	  true	  principle	  of	  ”payment	  for	  ecological	  services”	  and	  is	  
rather	  mainly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  assistance	  projects.	  Such	  assistance	  from	  Beijing	  does	  not	  have	  
a	  regular	  format	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  keep	  it	  endurable	  over	  a	  longer	  period.	  It	  should	  
be	  inserted	  here	  that	  the	  voices	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  stakeholders	  (farmers	  for	  example)	  have	  
not	  been	  heard	  or	  taken	  into	  account	  sufficiently	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  compensation	  
between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  The	  fact	  that	  Beijing	  Municipality	  has	  provided	  compensation	  mainly	  
in	  the	  name	  of	  projects	  indicates	  reluctance	  to	  give	  a	  wider	  payment	  that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  
all	  stakeholders.	  I	  would	  say	  that	  this	  means	  that	  particularly	  Beijing	  Municipality	  is	  more	  
concerned	  of	  short-­‐term	  profit	  and	  power,	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  a	  longer-­‐term	  agenda.	  
Third,	  a	  problem	  in	  China	  is	  that	  officials	  who	  work	  for	  the	  government	  will	  shift	  their	  posts	  
frequently	  and	  switch	  to	  other	  departments91.	  Given	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  ensure	  continuity	  in	  
the	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  long	  term	  is	  essentially	  beyond	  the	  political	  horizon.	  If	  this	  
structural	  factor	  give	  weak	  incentives	  to	  lengthening	  time	  horizons	  in	  politics,	  then	  we	  can	  
expect	  that	  long-­‐term	  future	  benefits	  have	  had	  a	  limited	  effect	  on	  the	  strategy	  of	  
cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  as	  well.	  The	  answer	  to	  my	  question	  is,	  therefore,	  ”no”.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Interview 1; 05/04/2010 
	   37	  
4.	  Monitoring	  
Does	  the	  monitoring	  system	  has	  the	  adequate	  capacity	  for	  managing	  water	  resources	  in	  the	  
Hai	  river	  basin?	  At	  present,	  the	  overall	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  water	  management	  in	  
China	  is	  fragmented.	  The	  authority	  to	  adress	  aspects	  of	  water	  resources	  management	  is	  
concentrated	  in	  the	  MWR.	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  this	  agency	  there	  is	  a	  Hai	  River	  Basin	  
Commission	  at	  the	  basin	  level	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  organizing	  and	  monitoring	  the	  
implementation	  of	  relevant	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  notable	  the	  Water	  law.	  Due	  to	  the	  
political	  and	  administrative	  system,	  Beijing	  and	  Hebei	  province	  both	  have	  the	  same	  rank	  as	  
the	  MWR	  which	  makes	  HRBC	  constrained	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  exercising	  orders	  to	  these	  
provinces	  in	  Hai	  river	  basin.	  Under	  such	  a	  system,	  the	  provincial	  governments	  are	  in	  the	  
upper	  hand	  for	  providing	  provincial	  water	  resources	  departments	  with	  budgets	  and	  staffing	  
while	  HRBC	  are	  marginalized	  in	  their	  independent	  action.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  HRBC	  faces	  
important	  constraints	  to	  implement	  integrated	  plans	  for	  river	  basin	  development,	  especially	  
because	  various	  stakeholders,	  officials	  and	  experts	  from	  the	  provinces	  have	  no	  role	  in	  their	  
governance.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  eco-­‐compensation	  mechanisms	  have	  not	  
been	  sufficiently	  institutionalized	  shows	  the	  need	  for	  an	  institution	  that	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  
cross	  provincial	  boundaries.	  For	  example,	  the	  ecological	  compensation	  for	  the	  upstream	  
areas	  of	  Guanting	  and	  Miyun	  reservoirs	  are	  mainly	  undertaken	  by	  forestry,	  water	  resources	  
and	  environmental	  protection	  agencies,	  without	  a	  coordinated	  authority	  that	  can	  integrate	  
the	  stakeholders	  involved.	  
A	  further	  problem	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  management	  of	  water	  quantity	  and	  quality	  are	  
separated	  from	  each	  other	  and	  not	  designed	  in	  an	  integrated	  way.	  It	  is	  relevant	  to	  mention	  
here	  that	  MWR	  is	  responsible	  for	  water	  quantity,	  while	  MEP	  is	  responsible	  for	  water	  quality	  
–	  whose	  overlaps	  in	  monitoring	  act	  as	  obstacles	  to	  more	  efficient	  monitoring	  and	  better	  
water	  management.	  Since	  the	  system	  does	  not	  allow	  HRBC	  to	  exercise	  authority	  across	  
administrative	  boundaries	  in	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  districts,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  cooperation	  between	  
Hebei-­‐Beijing	  have	  not	  emerged	  due	  to	  HRBC.	  What	  about	  the	  question?	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  
the	  above	  reasoning	  is	  well	  consistent	  with	  the	  answer	  ”no”.	  
	  
5.	  Conflict-­‐resolution	  Mechanisms	  
Monitoring	  is	  not	  the	  only	  source	  of	  problem	  in	  dealing	  with	  water	  issues,	  crossing	  
administrative	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  in	  China.	  Like	  in	  the	  previous	  part	  the	  same	  
reasoning	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  question:	  Are	  there	  any	  mechanisms	  for	  discussing	  and	  
resolving	  conflictual	  water	  issues	  between	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing?	  	  	  
Basically,	  there	  is	  no	  institution	  which	  can	  solve	  conflicts	  between	  different	  water	  user	  
groups	  in	  China.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  water	  competitions,	  such	  complaints	  or	  disputes	  are	  rarely	  
resolved	  due	  to	  inadequacy	  of	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms,	  political	  interference	  at	  local	  
levels	  and	  bureaucratic	  inefficency92.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  reasons	  for	  
these	  transjurisdictional	  conflicts	  is	  that,	  under	  current	  system,	  each	  province	  is	  responsible	  
for	  its	  own	  water	  quality	  and	  quantity	  management.	  For	  example,	  Beijing	  Muncipality	  has	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the	  authority	  to	  sanction	  against	  those	  who	  break	  the	  law	  within	  its	  borders,	  but	  they	  
cannot	  go	  to	  Hebei	  to	  enforce	  the	  water	  protection	  law.	  This	  should	  be	  done	  by	  HRBC	  
according	  to	  their	  responsibility	  to	  resolve	  inter-­‐provincial	  water	  conflicts	  in	  Hai	  river	  basin.	  
But	  in	  practice,	  disputes	  over	  water	  use	  and	  distribution	  are	  rarely	  resolved	  since	  HRBC	  is	  a	  
weak	  institution	  and	  there	  are	  no	  detailed	  procedures	  in	  the	  law	  for	  solving	  conflicts	  of	  
water	  quantity.	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  HRBC	  is	  appointed	  by	  the	  MWR	  –	  it	  has	  no	  legal	  
status	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  pollution	  situation.	  Settling	  pollution	  disputes	  are	  instead	  handled	  
by	  MEP	  but	  they	  face	  difficulties	  to	  act	  in	  practice	  since	  they	  find	  themselves	  in	  conflict	  with	  
their	  ”bosses”,	  namely	  the	  local	  governments	  which	  might	  have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  not	  
intervene	  against	  polluting	  companies.	  They	  are	  also	  hampered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
right	  or	  procedure	  for	  one	  jurisdiction	  to	  sue	  another	  for	  pollution	  damages.	  	  Of	  the	  conflict-­‐
resolution	  mechanisms	  I	  have	  mentioned	  here,	  there	  are	  no	  indications	  that	  they	  would	  
have	  shaped	  the	  interaction	  among	  the	  intergoverments	  and	  thus	  enabled	  stable	  
cooperation.	  However,	  this	  observation	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  policy	  makers	  not	  have	  pushed	  
forward	  environmental	  protection	  on	  transboundary	  issues,	  it	  rather	  shows	  the	  challenge	  to	  
translate	  words	  into	  action.	  
The	  above	  discussions	  shows	  that	  reciprocal	  interdependence	  and	  uncertainty	  reduction	  
have	  contributed	  to	  cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing,	  while	  there	  are	  no	  indications	  
which	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  cooperation	  over	  scarce	  water	  resources	  has	  emerged	  due	  to	  
extended	  time	  horizons,	  monitoring	  or	  conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms.	  As	  highlighted	  in	  my	  
analysis,	  cooperation	  has	  been	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  intergovernments	  involved,	  and	  partly	  
hinges	  on	  the	  set	  up	  of	  mutual	  gains	  and	  reduced	  uncertainty	  and	  mistrust.	  
Following	  principle	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  on	  my	  analytical	  framework,	  have	  these	  principles	  provided	  
incentives	  to	  cooperate	  by	  itself	  or	  do	  they	  structurally	  depend	  on	  institutional	  conditions?	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  physically	  interdependent	  
because	  water	  bodies	  respect	  no	  boundaries	  and	  therein	  lies	  opportunities	  for	  cooperation.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  potential	  gains	  of	  cooperation	  are	  hampered	  by	  Beijings	  political	  and	  
economical	  advantage	  which	  makes	  them	  reluctant	  to	  give	  side	  payments	  to	  Hebei.	  Since	  
several	  interviews	  have	  confirmed	  Beijings	  reluctance	  to	  develop	  procedures	  for	  
cooperation93,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  changed	  path	  that	  occured	  in	  2006	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  
structures	  that	  shaped	  the	  behavioral	  roles	  of	  the	  actors.	  Rational	  actors	  do	  not	  make	  
decisions	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  they	  do	  have	  to	  adapt	  to	  structural	  conditions.	  Policy	  decisions	  –	  
such	  as	  passing	  of	  the	  Water	  Law	  in	  2002	  and	  the	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  policies	  in	  2005	  –	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  institutional	  incentives,	  which	  in	  turn	  changed	  Hebei-­‐Beijngs	  behavioral	  roles	  
and	  lowered	  transaction	  costs.	  In	  this	  case,	  principle	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  connected	  with	  
changing	  framework	  conditions	  which	  relies	  on	  a	  external	  authority	  that	  could	  impose	  a	  
solution	  by	  reducing	  uncertainty	  and	  making	  participation	  more	  benefit-­‐	  driven.	  The	  
external	  authority	  I	  am	  thinking	  of,	  which	  will	  be	  principle	  (6)	  on	  my	  analytical	  framework,	  
is:	  State	  Council.	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6.	  External	  Authority	  
“The	  cooperation	  would	  not	  have	  happened	  without	  the	  coordination	  of	  the	  State	  Council”	  	  
	  –	  Interview	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  changed	  path	  of	  cooperation	  that	  arose	  in	  2006	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  able	  to	  prosper	  if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  for	  the	  coordination	  the	  intergovernments	  received	  
from	  the	  State	  Council94.	  If	  the	  State	  Council	  had	  not	  designed	  policies	  and	  canalized	  
different	  incentives	  for	  water-­‐cooperation,	  such	  as	  water-­‐use	  rights	  system	  and	  eco-­‐
compensation	  policies,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  the	  self-­‐interested	  
intergovernments	  to	  shift	  their	  preferences	  and	  choose	  cooperation.	  According	  to	  sources	  
in	  the	  Hebei	  government	  this	  kind	  of	  upstream-­‐downstream	  compensation-­‐agreement	  that	  
occured	  in	  2006,	  would	  not	  have	  occured	  voluntarily	  without	  encouragement	  from	  higher	  
levels	  of	  government95.	  It	  is	  significant	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  context	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  cooperation.	  As	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  earlier	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  policy-­‐
platform	  designed	  by	  the	  State	  Council	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  moment	  in	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  21	  century.	  It	  occurs	  when	  the	  State	  Council	  was	  caught	  in	  a	  dilemma	  and	  
decided	  to	  implement	  the	  “Plan	  for	  Sustainable	  Water	  Utilization	  in	  Early	  21st	  Century	  
(2001-­‐2005).	  This	  decision	  was	  a	  result	  of	  two	  events	  that	  converged.	  The	  first	  event	  has	  its	  
origin	  in	  the	  State	  Council:s	  urgent	  concern	  on	  its	  water	  crisis	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  21	  
century	  when	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  competition	  between	  different	  users	  is	  becoming	  more	  
severe.	  The	  second	  event	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Olympics	  bid	  victory	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2001.	  
With	  these	  two	  factors	  acted	  as	  catalysts,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  2001-­‐project	  became	  
inenvitable.	  Furthermore,	  you	  cannot	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  Chinas	  WTO	  membership	  
in	  late	  2001	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  Chinas	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  environmental	  arena	  when	  
Chinas	  concern	  of	  its	  international	  image	  increased.	  	  As	  highlighted	  in	  chapter	  6.4	  this	  
project	  from	  2001-­‐2005	  promoted	  better	  coordination	  in	  the	  region	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  
several	  other	  important	  policy-­‐steps	  towards	  cooperation.	  The	  political	  decisions	  I	  am	  
thinking	  of	  is	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Water	  Law	  in	  2002	  and	  the	  Water	  Rights	  Transfer	  Policies	  in	  
2005,	  which	  together	  with	  water-­‐price	  bargaining	  initiatives	  gave	  Hebei	  province	  benefits	  
from	  the	  resource	  protection	  to	  downstream	  Beijing.	  With	  these	  policies,	  we	  could	  see	  a	  
transformation	  from	  administrative	  to	  more	  equal	  market-­‐dependent	  mechanisms.	  
	  
Following	  these	  policy	  designs	  in	  2001-­‐2005,	  the	  State	  Council	  initiated	  eco-­‐compensation	  
by	  using	  public	  finance	  and	  coordinating	  the	  intergovernments	  involved.	  This	  policy-­‐
platform	  reduced	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  increased	  transparency	  regarding	  their	  interests	  and	  
intentions.	  A	  channel	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  was	  now	  created	  for	  the	  intergovernments,	  
which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  agreement	  Memorandum	  on	  Consolidation	  of	  Cooperation	  in	  
Economic	  and	  Social	  Development	  in	  2006,	  listing	  cooperation	  in	  protection	  of	  water	  
resources	  and	  ecological	  environment.	  Although	  this	  agreement	  was	  finally	  developed	  by	  
Hebei-­‐Beijing,	  Beijing	  Muncipality	  would	  remain	  in	  a	  position	  reluctant	  to	  act	  and	  give	  
compensation	  to	  Hebei	  if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  for	  political	  impulses	  from	  the	  top.	  Therefore,	  the	  
State	  Council	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  providing	  policy	  guidance	  and	  financial	  support	  for	  
establishing	  the	  first	  mechanism	  of	  eco-­‐compensation	  between	  provinces	  in	  China.	  The	  
question	  is	  how	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  State	  Council	  has	  acted	  in	  this	  way?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Interview 1; 05/04/2010, Interview 2; 08/04/2010, Interview 4; 15/04/2010 
95 Interview 5; 18/04/2010 
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The	  answer	  is	  that	  this	  powerful	  political	  actor	  has	  succeeded	  in	  lengthening	  time	  horizons.	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  all	  policies,	  from	  the	  decision	  to	  implement	  the	  Plan	  for	  Sustainable	  
Water	  Utilization	  in	  Early	  21st	  Century	  (2001-­‐2005)	  to	  the	  decision	  on	  eco-­‐compensation	  in	  
Strengthening	  Environmental	  Protection	  for	  Scientific	  Development	  2005,	  is	  that	  they	  are	  all	  
long-­‐term	  commitments	  to	  address	  the	  ecological	  degradation	  in	  the	  affected	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  
region.	  Since	  the	  character	  of	  water	  problems	  is	  future	  bound,	  thereby	  threatening	  the	  
chinese	  state-­‐capacity	  in	  the	  long-­‐term96,	  has	  forced	  the	  State	  Council	  to	  include	  future	  
generations	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  My	  theory	  –	  that	  there	  is	  extended	  time	  horizons	  of	  an	  
external	  authority,	  namely	  the	  State	  Council	  –	  which	  can	  explain	  the	  changed	  path	  of	  
cooperation	  –	  can	  be	  further	  confirmed	  by	  a	  study	  which	  has	  examined	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  of	  the	  South	  To	  North	  Water	  Diversion	  Project.	  Before	  I	  move	  on	  and	  describe	  the	  
final	  decision	  to	  start	  the	  SNWT,	  it	  is	  worth	  nothing	  that	  this	  project	  has	  also	  promoted	  
cooperation	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  on	  water	  issues.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  idea	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  project	  in	  2002,	  the	  
objective	  of	  the	  SNWT	  has	  been	  to	  divert	  a	  capacity	  of	  45	  billion	  m3	  through	  three	  routes	  in	  
the	  middle	  of	  this	  century.	  Given	  large	  uncertainties	  in	  future	  water	  demand,	  a	  question	  
would	  be	  how	  the	  SNWT	  project	  has	  been	  able	  to	  receive	  the	  final	  approval	  from	  the	  State	  
Council	  and	  to	  be	  implemented	  rather	  hastily	  before	  the	  deadline.	  According	  to	  the	  ETH-­‐
Board	  of	  Switzerland	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  environmental	  objective	  has	  provided	  a	  strong	  
argument	  for	  the	  final	  decision	  to	  start	  the	  project.	  Their	  analysis	  highlights,	  although	  
alleviating	  water	  stress	  in	  the	  economic	  sectors	  remained	  the	  short-­‐term	  priority,	  improving	  
the	  environment	  by	  allocating	  required	  water	  for	  ecosystem	  recovery	  became	  a	  long-­‐term	  
goal97.	  Like	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  in	  my	  own	  study,	  their	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  increased	  
urgency	  to	  halt	  the	  environmental	  degradation	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  final	  decision	  on	  
implementation.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  indicates	  a	  change	  in	  the	  mental	  maps	  of	  the	  State	  
Council	  –	  which	  means	  that	  environmental	  issues	  have	  been	  a	  powerful	  incentive	  to	  extend	  
the	  time	  horizons	  of	  the	  State	  Councils	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  reasoning	  above,	  we	  can	  now	  answer	  the	  question:	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  that	  
self-­‐interested	  intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  Municipality	  are	  
collaborating	  on	  scarce	  water	  resources?	  The	  answer	  to	  my	  question,	  and	  thus	  the	  causal	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Interview 6; 20/04/2010. Also confirmed by Elisabeth Economy (1997) whose findings suggest that water 
scarcity should be considered a long-term threat to the Chinese state-capacity. Available online at 
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/china/chinasum.htm 
97 Hong Yang & Alexander J.B. Zehnder., (2005), ”The South-North Water Transfer Project in China: An 
analysis of Water Demand Uncertainty and Environmental Objectives in Decision Making”, Swiss Federal 
Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, Water International, Volume 30, Number 3, p.339-349 
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8.	  Conclusion	  and	  Remarks	  for	  Future	  Studies	  
	  
The	  apocalyptic	  warnings	  of	  water	  wars	  have	  appeared	  frequently	  in	  scientific	  journals	  over	  
the	  years.	  As	  the	  severity	  of	  water	  resources	  have	  intensified	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  so	  have	  the	  
conflicts.	  In	  China,	  studies	  warning	  of	  environmentally	  induced	  conflict	  in	  this	  country	  has	  
predominantly	  ended	  with	  highly	  predicted	  outcomes	  rather	  than	  careful	  analysis	  of	  specific	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  cooperation	  could	  forestall	  violence.	  In	  this	  study,	  I	  have	  addressed	  
this	  empirical	  gap	  at	  the	  intrastate	  level	  by	  exploring	  how	  and	  why	  the	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  case	  
does	  not	  follow	  the	  theorized	  trajectory	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  cooperation	  when	  we	  
should	  expect	  conflict.	  Most	  research	  that	  has	  been	  undertaken	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  
environmental	  cooperation	  suggest	  that	  situations	  charachterised	  by	  environmental	  
degradation	  have	  certain	  propererties	  such	  as	  	  –	  reciprocal	  interdependence,	  uncertainty	  
reduction	  and	  longer	  time	  horizons	  –	  which	  facilitate	  cooperation.	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  my	  
analysis,	  I	  have	  cross-­‐fertilized	  this	  theory	  with	  two	  of	  Nobel	  Price	  winner	  Elinor	  Ostroms	  
eight	  management	  principles	  and	  thereby	  created	  an	  analytical	  framework.	  Then	  I	  applied	  
this	  analytical	  tool	  on	  my	  case	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  primary	  research	  question:	  How	  can	  
we	  explain	  that	  self-­‐interested	  intergovernments	  like	  Hebei	  province	  and	  Beijing	  
Municipality	  are	  collaborating	  on	  scarce	  water	  resources?	  
From	  a	  theoretical	  stand	  point,	  existing	  theories	  have	  been	  tested	  but,	  as	  my	  empirical	  
study	  also	  led	  to	  an	  additional	  mechanism	  –	  external	  authority	  –	  I	  have	  developed	  further	  
existing	  theories.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  study	  corresponds	  to	  some	  degree	  well	  with	  the	  
environmental-­‐cooperation	  theory.	  It	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  reciprocal	  
interdependence	  and	  uncertainty	  reduction	  could	  be	  identified,	  but	  that	  these	  factors	  do	  not	  
significantly	  explain	  why	  the	  intergovernments	  in	  Hebei-­‐Beijing	  choosed	  the	  strategy	  of	  
cooperation	  in	  2006.	  The	  thesis	  rather	  highlight	  that	  an	  external	  authority	  –	  namely	  the	  
State	  Council	  –	  has	  been	  a	  key	  factor	  to	  enhance	  the	  interaction	  among	  the	  
intergovernments	  and	  thus	  enabled	  cooperation.	  These	  actions	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  traced	  to	  
changed	  mental	  maps	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  –	  as	  it	  shows	  that	  environmental	  issues	  have	  
been	  a	  powerful	  incentive	  to	  extend	  the	  time	  horizons	  of	  the	  State	  Councils	  decision-­‐making	  
in	  the	  beginning	  of	  21	  century.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  of	  significance	  for	  the	  conflict	  versus	  cooperation	  questions	  that	  have	  been	  
asked	  repeatedly	  in	  the	  environmental	  field	  as	  it	  contributes	  with	  an	  example	  from	  the	  
intrastate	  level,	  namley	  –	  the	  Beijing-­‐Hebei	  case	  which	  reflects	  the	  first	  agreement	  of	  eco-­‐
compensation	  between	  upstream-­‐downstream	  provinces	  in	  China.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  of	  
significance	  for	  the	  environmental-­‐cooperation	  theory	  since	  my	  study	  shows	  that	  even	  
though	  a	  situation	  characterised	  by	  water	  scarcity	  has	  certain	  cooperation-­‐promoting	  
factors,	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  self-­‐interested	  actors	  to	  develop	  cooperation	  without	  an	  external	  
authority.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Ostrom´s	  work,	  who	  argues	  that	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  maintain	  a	  
common	  resource	  through	  self-­‐governance	  without	  outside	  intervention,	  my	  study	  shows	  
that	  external	  institutional	  arrangements	  have	  been	  a	  precondition	  for	  managing	  water	  
resources	  and	  avoid	  an	  escalation	  of	  conflict	  between	  Hebei-­‐Beijing.	  To	  gain	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  water	  cooperation	  in	  China	  a	  remark	  on	  future	  studies	  can	  be	  given:	  
	  
• It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  design	  a	  comparative	  research	  with	  analyses	  on	  several	  
cases	  of	  eco-­‐compensation	  in	  China.	  A	  focus	  could	  be	  put	  on	  which	  institutional	  
factors	  promote	  and	  hinder	  eco-­‐compensation	  agreements.	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